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ABSTRACT

HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION AND RESPONSE:
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS IN FACE OF NATURAL DISASTERS
Julia Wong
Dr. Eileen Doherty-Sil

In the 21st century, international humanitarian response remains encumbered by
serious gaps and unpreparedness. The inefficacies stem from longstanding organizational
challenges in the areas of accountability, predictability, and reliability. Humanitarian
reform comprises three pillars: the cluster approach, timely financing, and strategic
leadership. Cluster coordination, introduced in the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review
commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, holds great
significance because it calls for leadership in specific need areas and for the development
of partnerships. This thesis aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on
improving humanitarian processes to better meet the needs of affected populations by
examining whether cluster coordination builds effective responses and whether a
different actor may temporarily provide governmental services when the government is
absent. The cases of Haiti and Myanmar, which illustrate different successes and
challenges of the cluster approach, identify four fundamental features of disaster
coordination and response. These features demonstrate that in an environment of trust
and openness, strong cluster coordination can empower leadership and help leverage the
full range of existing capacities, resulting in an effective response.
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
On January 12, 2010 at 16:53 local time, a 7.0 MW earthquake decimated 222,750
lives and injured 300,572 people, affecting an estimated 3 million Haitians and crippling
the country’s economic heart Port-au-Prince with the significant infrastructural damage.
Displacement, disease, food insecurity, psychosocial trauma, ruined livelihoods, and
arrested education overwhelmed the ravaged city in the earthquake’s aftermath. Twelve
months into the struggle, Port-au-Prince remained a tent city squatting in the vast rubble
remains due to stalled reconstruction. Despite the technological and scientific
advancements of the 21st century, the global community has yet to develop the
mechanisms to respond strategically and proficiently to natural disasters. Given the
persistent nature of certain natural disasters, such as floods in Pakistan and droughts in
Kenya, and growing climatic fluctuations engendering large-scale calamities, it is
imperative for the United Nations (UN), governments, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to develop flexible coordination and response plans that enable
humanitarian actors to properly meet the needs of the affected population. Currently,
international humanitarian coordination faces serious organizational challenges, which in
turn encumber humanitarian response and lead to unpreparedness and serious gaps in
service provision. These inefficiencies stem from longstanding systemic challenges—a
lack of strategic leadership, a multitude of international agents attempting to fulfill their
own mandates and missions, and the difficulty of holding agents accountable due to the
voluntary nature of humanitarian response.
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This work aims to shed light on these systemic challenges in the humanitarian
sphere and to analyze the effectiveness of the novel cluster approach, introduced in the
2005 Humanitarian Response Review commissioned by the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Cluster coordination extends the assumption that
effective collaboration among the UN, governments, and NGOs leads to an effective
humanitarian response, and the cluster approach attempts to redress significant capacity
gaps by bolstering leadership across the different areas of response or “clusters.” The
success of the cluster approach depends on whether it implements the factors that lead to
effective humanitarian responses. Analyzing the specific factors that contribute to a
response’s effectiveness, this study examines in detail the international response to the
2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and focuses on cluster
coordination in the areas of nutrition and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH).

CASE SELECTION
The selection of Haiti and Myanmar as primary case studies is based primarily on
their contextual similarity, since both countries encountered natural disasters of
comparable scale and scope and rolled out cluster coordination.1 While Haiti is the
poorest nation in the western hemisphere, Myanmar is one of the most impoverished
nations in Asia with the Government of the Union of Myanmar (GoUM) controlling the
wealth of natural resources. Also, both countries’ history of colonialism and political
instability create heightened challenges for international aid. The delicate political
situation in Haiti and Myanmar at times impedes the entry and delivery of foreign aid.
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Despite their contextual similarity, important differences exist between Haiti and
Myanmar. Namely, one finds a stark difference in the political response to the natural
disasters. In Haiti, the collapse of government infrastructure led to the postponement of
the country’s legislative elections from February 28, 2010 to November 28, 2010. The
third democratic election to occur in Haiti, it transpired belatedly and in the context of
growing international pressure over the country’s instability. In Myanmar, on the other
hand, the military junta exerted a domineering hand in carrying out the nationwide
constitutional referendum at the cost of the disaster victims barely a week following
Cyclone Nargis. A range of egregious actions—diverting resources for the victims
toward the referendum and evicting refugees to convert shelters into polling stations,
among other transgressions—raised outcries against the hollow democratic agenda of the
junta. This marked difference presents another dimension with which to compare Haiti
and Myanmar: the presence or absence of a strong government and its implications for a
country devastated by a natural disaster. The contrasting accounts across countries and
across clusters shed insight on the variability of the cluster approach, its effectiveness,
and the roles of the international agencies, states, and NGOs in humanitarian response.

SYNOPSIS
The organization of this thesis in seven chapters presents a holistic view of
international humanitarian coordination and response, the cluster approach, and its
deployment and effectiveness. The first chapter describes the relevance of humanitarian
coordination and response in international policy and in academia and briefly introduces
the selection of Haiti and Myanmar as case studies. Chapter Two lays out two
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hypotheses regarding effective humanitarian response and explicates the research
approach. Following an overview of the humanitarian landscape and its evolution across
time in Chapter Three, Chapter Four explores the literature examining the role of NGOs,
which yields insight on the second hypothesis and the interplay among international
agencies, states, and NGOs. Next, Chapter Five presents the cluster approach as rolled
out in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters in Haiti and in Myanmar, and Chapter Six
compares the two case studies. Finally, Chapter Seven consolidates the analysis and calls
for greater participation and integration of NGOs, government, and civil society in the
deliberative process of the UN, which holds potential as the primary means to improved
humanitarian coordination and humanitarian response. The cases of Haiti and Myanmar,
which illustrate different successes and challenges of the cluster approach, identify four
fundamental features of disaster coordination and response. These features demonstrate
that in an environment of trust and openness, strong cluster coordination can empower
leadership and help leverage the full range of existing capacities, resulting in an effective
response.
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CHAPTER II:
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Two hypotheses respond to the inquiries mentioned above:
Hypothesis 1: The cluster approach, which has its basis in the argument that
coordination among the different humanitarian actors is essential to effective
humanitarian response, helps to surmount the systemic challenges impeding effective
humanitarian response.
This hypothesis draws upon the disciplines of organizational theory and
management. At the core of this idea, capitalizing on the various actors’ strengths
through collaborative partnerships is integral because it allows dynamic synergies to
develop. Although it may be possible for independent, diverse, and uncoordinated actors
to deliver aid, the humanitarian response will likely be disorganized and duplicative. A
framework for collaboration is thus necessary, and strong partnerships among
international agencies, states, and NGOs will facilitate a more effective humanitarian
response.
In order to test this hypothesis, one must define the roles of each actor. The
following roles are accorded by a strengths-based approach so that the expertise of the
different actors may be harnessed. The UN should execute its role as an all-around
expert on coordination and response, training personnel both internationally and locally
to deliver aid in the most effective ways. It presides over cluster meetings as a neutral
agent, mitigating conflicts among the different parties. The UN also shoulders the
responsibility of preparing comprehensive reports and assessments, keeping global
stakeholders appraised of the situation on the ground. It acts as the communication hub
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and informs the general public of the still existing needs. In this way, the UN helps the
victims raise funds for necessities and fulfills its mandate. Working alongside the UN,
the government maintains the situation on the ground, tying together response efforts on a
national level. The government raises public morale through its broadcasts and
communication, directing its citizens to relief stations and alerting them of any new
developments. Also, the government may use its preexisting understanding of the
national terrain, its manpower through its public servants, and its network of national and
local NGOs and corporations to lead the relief effort. Ultimately, the government has the
greatest impetus to see the country return to normalcy, so it is responsible for sustaining
the response and serves as the provider of last resort on a national level. In addition,
there are the many international, national, and local NGOs. All three have field expertise,
and each has different relationships with the various stakeholders. Often, the national
and local NGOs are the best equipped to deliver aid because of their knowledge of the
local language, politics, culture, and norms. Altogether, the UN agencies, states, and
NGOs offer unique expertise and capacities that should be leveraged.
Hypothesis 2: In the absence of a working host government, a robust
international NGO or agency may be able to administer government functions
temporarily. The humanitarian response remains incumbent upon the national
government—and, to a lesser extent, local NGOs—to reinstitute their services.
This hypothesis suggests that a robust international NGO or agency can step in to
temporarily administer governmental functions in the wake of a crisis, but the
government must be reinstated for the long-term viability of the response plan. Studying
the Haiti earthquake, which decimated the government’s ability to provide for its citizens,
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offers an instructive example for assessing the various actors’ roles and testing whether
successful humanitarian aid can be achieved in the absence of a functioning state.
Myanmar presents a different but equally compelling case in which the government
rebuffed international assistance at the onset of the disaster, but eventually opened its
borders.
In order to test these two hypotheses, I draw on both quantitative and qualitative
data from comprehensive country reports prepared by an array of actors from the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to
the governments and the Global Public Policy Institute and Groupe Urgence
Réhabilitation Développement (GPPI-URD).2 Specifically, these include IASC’s
Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti;3 UNICEF’s Children in Haiti: One Year
After—The Long Road from Relief to Recovery issue; Active Learning Network for
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action’s (ALNAP) Haiti Earthquake
Response: Context Analysis, Post-Nargis Joint Assessment, and the ensuing Post-Nargis
Periodic Reviews; GPPI-URD’s Second Phase Cluster Approach Evaluation; OCHA’s
Flash Appeals; and news reports from Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN).
These country reports provide clear ground assessments using similar criteria for
analyzing the responses in Haiti and Myanmar.
First, this research examines the effectiveness of the international humanitarian
response in Haiti and Myanmar. I measure effectiveness on a number of dimensions
based on UN evaluation methodologies:
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GPPI-URD consists of two groups independent from the UN.

The report was written six months after the Haiti earthquake following a request by the
Principals of the IASC at a meeting on May 6, 2010.
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•

Predictability and accountability of leadership and ownership

•

Cohesiveness in partnerships

•

Impact on affected populations vis-à-vis engagement and outstanding
gaps.

Each of these three indicators is core to UN evaluation methodologies, and for the sake of
completeness, this thesis discusses all three indicators and conducts a cross-country and
cross-cluster comparison using a straightforward three-level classification system.
Second, because the core focus of this thesis centers on the role of partnerships in
affecting overall outcomes, the significance of global partnerships among international
agencies, governments, and NGOs will be assessed in further detail. My hypotheses and
the core of my analysis treat cohesiveness of partnerships not simply as a measure of
effectiveness (that is, I do not assume cohesiveness is automatically an indication of
effectiveness). Rather, I examine the underlying logic by which that cohesiveness
impacts overall aid effectiveness. Particular attention will be devoted to instances of
partnerships that emerged in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters in Haiti and Myanmar,
and these will be compared against situations in which actors acted independently.
Interviews with humanitarian practitioners provide stakeholder input and infuse a more
in-depth perspective into collaborative global partnerships.
Third, the research will assess the various actors’ roles and responsibilities in the
respective cases of Haiti and Myanmar. NGOs and international agencies such as the UN
have developed their capacity through better organization and greater experience. The
role of NGOs has also evolved due to increasingly collaborative partnerships among the
UN, governments, and NGOs—particularly local and national NGOs. This leads to the
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question, “Could recovery be achieved efficiently without an existing government
infrastructure?” Particularly, NGOs’ ability to function within the international
framework will be examined through the varying cluster performance in Haiti and
Myanmar in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters.4 Also, various lessons will be drawn
from the Myanmar and Haiti experiences to determine whether or not the presence of a
government is vital to a country’s recovery. Furthermore, the selected body of
illustrative material on global governance and NGOs, together with reports from UN
agencies and independent organizations, provides a variety of perspectives on
international agencies, NGOs, and states as viable partners and impactful actors.
The study of the three aforementioned points of focus—three indicators of
effectiveness, role of partnerships, and roles of humanitarian actors—will shed light on
whether strong partnerships among humanitarian actors contribute to an effective
humanitarian response and whether sustained efficacy of a humanitarian response
depends upon the state.
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The cluster areas span a broad range of needs, from agriculture, food aid, early recovery,
education, emergency shelter and non-food items, to logistics, protection, health, nutrition, and
WASH.
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CHAPTER III:
BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID

Moving Forward from Rwanda, 1994
Over the past four decades, the number of man-made and natural disasters has
increased steadily, as reported in a study released at the May 1994 World Conference on
Natural Disaster Reduction. “More than 30 million people in 29 countries” needed
emergency assistance in mid-1994 (Encyclopedia of the Nations). This growth in the
number of disasters is paralleled by an increase in international humanitarian aid activity
in the 1990s, expressly evident in Rwanda during the Great Lakes refugee crisis of April
1994. The exodus of over two million Rwandans, mainly ethnic Hutus fleeing from the
Tutsis, to neighboring African countries in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide
quickly garnered international attention, and over two hundred national and international
NGOs poured into Kigali, the capital of Rwanda (Renzaho 5). Despite the impressive
influx of aid, the NGOs were unable to harness and deploy their resources and expertise
effectively. In fact, aid delivery was tantamount to a catastrophe in and of itself.
Numerous NGO and donor evaluations reflect upon the humanitarian response
with heavy criticism toward the exploitation, imperialism, and failure of aid programs.
Firstly, stabilization programs remained a relatively underdeveloped concept with which
many newer NGOs had little expertise and no experience, particularly in implementation.
Many components had to be taken into consideration, including rapid response to enable
day-to-day functioning, plans for longer-term development, and local perspectives.
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Certain NGOs acted with naiveté, initiating ill-informed programs with the assumption
that they knew the best course of action for the local populace without taking into
consideration the larger political context (Renzaho 9). Secondly, NGOs charged with
zealousness in their humanitarian mission barreled forward in an uncoordinated fashion.
This inadvertently led to a duplication of aid efforts in certain areas, leaving other needs
unattended to. Thirdly, the lack of coordination further exacerbated the crisis because
inter-NGO competition for limited local resources created hyperinflation, and powerhungry local leaders manipulated goods in refugee camps to further their political
ambitions.

International Standards and Guidelines
Following the Rwanda crisis, international agencies and NGOs realized the great
necessity to reinvent the humanitarian aid system beginning with the development of
international standards and operational guidelines. They duly attributed the catastrophic
response in Rwanda to the lack of shared technical guidelines. Under the guidance of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, six networks of NGOs developed
the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
NGOs in Disaster Relief, and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
adopted the Code of Conduct in 1994. The primary principle rests upon the humanitarian
imperative—all human beings are entitled to humanitarian aid. The following standards
demand impartiality, political and religious neutrality, coordination between NGOs,
respect toward beneficiaries and local customs, inclusion of all relevant stakeholders,
accountability, and professionalism. The Code of Conduct introduces two core concepts
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in emergency response. First, these standards propel agencies and NGOs to move away
from the imperialist model of aid toward a system that empowers the beneficiaries to
rebuild their community and a system in which all stakeholders have a voice in the
process. Second, the principle of accountability enumerates dual requirements that aim to
improve and maintain the quality of aid: regular monitoring and reporting to all
stakeholders. Currently, the Code of Conduct has 464 signatories who agree to abide by
the ten principles laid out in the document. It is important to note that although the
majority of the international community has accepted these universal standards governing
emergency response, they are legally unenforceable.
As a follow-up to the Code of Conduct, a group of humanitarian NGOs launched
the Sphere Project in 1997 alongside the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement. Whereas the Code of Conduct establishes universal standards, the Sphere
Project attempts to provide an operational framework for accountability in disaster
response. Sphere’s two core beliefs spring from the humanitarian imperative as
delineated in the Code of Conduct. “All possible steps should be taken to alleviate
human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and…those affected by disaster
have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance” (Sphere Handbook).
The Sphere Handbook, finalized in 2004, includes two key documents: the Minimum
Standards and the Humanitarian Charter. The Minimum Standards outline the minimum
qualitative standards that should be met in these five sectors: water and sanitation,
nutrition, food, shelter, and health. Parallels can be drawn between these standards and
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), particularly the goals of eradicating
extreme poverty and hunger, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality,
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combating diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global
partnership for development (MDG). The Humanitarian Charter complements the
Minimum Standards by hearkening to the rights of the beneficiaries and the
responsibilities of NGOs and governments. Taken together, the Humanitarian Charter
and the Minimum Standards contribute to an important operational framework for quality
and for accountability in disaster relief efforts.

Humanitarian Response Review of 2005
Even with the establishment of international standards and guidelines,
humanitarian response is often perceived as inadequate and unable to meet the basic
needs of affected populations. In 2005, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) commissioned the
Humanitarian Response Review in light of the increasing levels of humanitarian demand
and the need to ensure that humanitarian actors take the appropriate steps to improve the
timeliness and impact of humanitarian interventions. This report is an independent
assessment conducted by a team of three senior external consultants that reflects upon the
humanitarian system, identifies the capabilities and shortfalls of humanitarian response,
and develops a joint plan of action to improve response effectiveness and timeliness. A
large part of the review focuses on the response capacity of key humanitarian actors, such
as the UN, NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Both benchmarking and the
establishment of best practices are incorporated. Following a comprehensive review of
emergency funding, response capacity, and coordination and leadership roles, the
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analysis provides a set of recommendations to address the gaps and assist humanitarian
agencies in meeting future challenges.

THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE
The humanitarian aid system has matured over the past decade, particularly with
respect to the humanitarian reform agenda; however, it constantly adapts and evolves in
response to the various challenges created by complex emergencies in the post-Cold War
era. McCall links the rise in ethnic, religious, cultural, and nationalistic tensions to the
growing prevalence of complex emergencies. Coupled with the expanding breadth of
issues including environmental degradation, economic growth, stateless persons, climate
refugees, and internally displaced persons, these complex emergencies pose great
challenges to humanitarian actors. The lack of enforcement structures within the
coordination mandate debilitates their ability to tackle these complex emergencies.
Along with the emergence of new issues, five other challenges continue to plague
humanitarian aid: shrinking humanitarian space, inadequate funding, uncertainty
surrounding disasters, firefighting, and poor coordination.
First, humanitarian space refers to (1) the physical space in which agencies
conduct humanitarian work, and (2) the virtual space in which the various agencies
interact (Tomasini 25). Both physical and virtual spaces are shrinking because more
areas are becoming insecure, and the overcrowding of NGOs with conflicting mandates
and missions renders it increasingly harder for NGOs to carry out their work effectively.
“The decline of humanitarian space is likely a product of complex factors, starting with
the overall increasing level of violence and political judgments by insurgent groups that
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in particular situations they gain more by attacking civilians than they lose by defying
international humanitarian law” (Rubenstein 4). For example “in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, humanitarian space has shrunk as the Taliban and other insurgent groups have
stepped up attacks on civilians, especially international aid workers, contractors and local
leaders” (Rubenstein 1). The instability in the area poses dangers for both beneficiaries
and humanitarian workers, and incapacitated aid work may prove to be more detrimental
than no aid.
Second, the need for more funding is pervasive. Funds tend to be allocated for
visible and high-profile issues rather than on a needs basis, and this results in “fatigued
crises”—crises that still need attention but fall from the limelight (Tomasini 29).
Although Rwanda still required much rehabilitation work, “other ‘newsworthy’
international events soon focused global public attention elsewhere, with events in Haiti
and Chechnya replacing the ongoing crises in the Great Lakes region” (Wright 55). The
mediatization of crises led to a phenomenon in which areas with the most urgent needs
simply go unnoticed when the media does not focus on them (Tomasini 35). The
popularity of earmarked donations also leaves detrimental impacts. Donors often prefer
giving earmarked donations because they have greater influence over the way it is spent.
By targeting their investment in particular areas or sectors, they can fulfill their priorities.
This restrictiveness, however, results in a failure to meet the direst needs.
Third, high uncertainty surrounding the field can lead to the issue of firefighting,
where humanitarian actors become incapacitated by the urgency of the emergency
situation. When this occurs, problems tend to escalate into crises, and performance levels
drop along with the quality of aid. Lastly, coordination remains a key challenge in all
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disasters. Even with the elaborate UN humanitarian response systems in place, the need
for immediate rapid response and the highly different contexts of disasters make it
difficult for the agencies and NGOs to deliver aid programs efficiently and effectively
from the minute the disaster strikes.

THE PILLARS OF HUMANITARIAN REFORM
To facilitate the disaster management cycle, OCHA has in place three pillars of
humanitarian reform: the Humanitarian Coordinator System, the Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF), and the Cluster Approach. These three pillars aim to strengthen
the quality and quantity of leadership, improve the predictability of funding, and ensure
more effective coordination, respectively. All three pillars are grounded in a foundation
of collaborative partnerships between UN and non-UN actors.5
Figure 1. Three Pillars of Humanitarian Reform
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The foundation of collaborative partnerships is at times referred to as the fourth pillar of
humanitarian reform.
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Leadership: Humanitarian Coordinator System
The first pillar of humanitarian reform concerns leadership, which performs the
integral function of bringing together the diverse humanitarian actors, from host
governments and donors to international agencies and NGOs, toward the shared goal.
Beyond serving as a cohesive agent, the leadership also bears the responsibility of
maintaining the quality of aid and ensuring accountability to the affected communities.
The leadership reform effort centered on “clarifying duties and responsibilities of
Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) and increasing the quality of HC candidates”
(InterAction). To this end, OCHA endeavored to improve the recruitment process by
establishing the HC selection panel and the HC pool. The formerly UN-only process has
been opened to non-UN actors who may bring relevant experiences outside the UN
framework into the HC role. In addition to defining and broadening the qualifications for
the HC position, OCHA put together an HC training system. As NGOs put forward
nominations for the HC role, OCHA created “a pool of ‘pre-approved’ HCs that could be
sent out on short notice” (ICVA). Also, to address the issue of Residential Coordinators
(RCs) without humanitarian experience being asked to serve as joint RC/HCs, OCHA
offers training to equip RCs with knowledge on humanitarian issues and established a
mentoring program for seasoned RC/HCs to counsel newly appointed RC/HCs. In
certain situations, the RC and HC roles are separated.

Financing: Central Emergency Response Fund
Launched in 2006, CERF strives to “promote early action and response to reduce
loss of life, [to] enhance response to time-critical requirements, [and to] strengthen core
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elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises” (CERF Site). Various UN
studies show that aid given in the first three weeks following a disaster delivers the
largest impact (Kent 28). Essentially, CERF helps jump-start critical humanitarian
programs that lack funding. Voluntary contributions by governments and private sector
organizations enable the UN to allocate a total of US $500 million to disaster-stricken
countries in the form of rapid response grants or underfunded emergency grants. The
former promotes “early action and response to reduce loss of life and to enhance response
to time-critical requirements,” and the latter strengthens “core elements of humanitarian
response in underfunded crises” (CERF HC Info Sheet).
CERF is designed to complement the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), an
advocacy tool for humanitarian financing of long-term development. Stakeholders come
together to produce consolidated appeals highlighting needs in specific cluster areas, and
OCHA disseminates these appeals online and through its publications. Potential donors
rely on the detailed reports in the appeals to assess how much they will donate and which
cluster areas they will make donations toward. “On average, since 1992, the
Consolidated Appeals Process has sought $3.1 billion per year, and received $2.1 billion
per year (68%)” (CAP Site). The CAP, however, acts as much more than a mere appeal
for funding because aid organizations use CAP as an integral tool “to plan, implement
and monitor their activities together” (CAP Site). The CAP process begins with
analyzing the context, assessing needs, building scenarios, and setting priorities. Then it
advances into planning the response, issuing a flash or consolidated appeal, monitoring
aid and revising the appeal, and finally reporting the situation to stakeholders. Its
invaluable assessment provides a platform on which governments, donors, aid agencies,
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and NGOs can collaborate to ensure the delivery of high-quality aid. Both CERF and
CAP complement existing humanitarian funding mechanisms, and traditional donor
sources, such as governments, still fund the majority of needs. The United States is the
largest state donor, contributing US $73,394,580 in 2009. The European Commission
and Japan follow behind the US in contributions.

Coordination: Cluster Approach
The Cluster System is the third key UN humanitarian reform mechanism. The IASC
created the cluster system in 2005 in response to a UN review on the global humanitarian
system, which recommended establishing the core areas of need. Currently eleven
clusters have been identified: protection, camp coordination and management, water
sanitation and hygiene, health, emergency shelter, nutrition, emergency
telecommunications, logistics, early recovery, education, and agriculture (UNMIT Site).
Each cluster has a designated UN agency that serves as its lead agency at the global level.
The following table shows the eleven designated global cluster leads, each accountable to
the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC):
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Figure 2. Clusters and Their Lead Agencies at the Global Level

At the onset of a disaster, the global cluster lead with the corresponding expertise is
responsible for “strengthening system-wide preparedness and technical capacity and
ensuring predictable leadership, accountability, and partnership,” according to the Second
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Phase IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation.6 The lead agency strives to ensure that all
needs in the cluster area are met and acts as the provider of last resort (PoLR); this means
that the cluster lead should serve as backup in filling any existing gaps if no other
humanitarian actor is able to do so. At the onset of a disaster, the government may
choose to activate clusters. After the activation of a cluster, a lead organization—at times
the same as the global cluster lead—receives the designation for overseeing nationallevel coordination. Cluster leads conduct regular meetings at the national, sub-national,
and provincial levels on a “daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis, depending on the
intensity of the crisis” (IASC Cluster Approach Phase 2). During these meetings, cluster
members share information, provide mutual feedback, create cluster strategies and work
plans, organize joint activities, and prepare major funding appeals. Working alongside
the different cluster levels, the global cluster lead focuses their efforts in three areas:
standards and policy-setting, building response capacity, and operational support. The
following diagram shows the organization of the cluster levels.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6

“The service clusters differ from the response clusters in that they provide services to other
humanitarian organizations, rather than the affected population, have a stronger focus on global
preparedness activities and, where necessary, act as the main service provider, rather than as
provider of last resort” (IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation Phase 2).
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Figure 3. Levels of the Cluster Approach

GPPI-URD conducted a survey to gather feedback on the cluster system, contacting
over 600 humanitarians in different UN agencies and international NGOs. Of the 241
respondents, “75% of respondents felt that the introduction of the cluster approach had
improved coordination and information exchange at the global level.” They attributed
improved dynamics among humanitarian actors to well-functioning global clusters,
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particularly WASH, Logistics, and Education. Less than a decade old, the cluster
approach has much room for improvement, and humanitarian practitioners continue to
fine-tune the system.

THE UN, STATES, AND NGOS IN THE HUMANITARIAN SPACE
Before exploring humanitarian response, one must establish an understanding of
the humanitarian environment and particularly of the formal and informal linkages
created among the different international actors. The main actors in the humanitarian
space include intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, states, and NGOs. While
UN agencies and states constitute the structured bureaucracy, the “rapidly evolving NGO
galaxy” challenges its relatively static counterparts with its unstructured nature (Donini).

UN Actors
The reinvention of the humanitarian aid system not only entailed the
establishment of the Code of Conduct and the Sphere Project, but also required the
creation and redefinition of the roles of various international agencies and NGOs. In
1991, OCHA was established as the arm of the UN Secretariat that would amalgamate
the humanitarian partners to bring about a coordinated rapid response to emergencies.
Among other missions, OCHA primarily serves to “mobilize and coordinate effective and
principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors”
(OCHA Site). To this end, OCHA advocates for the rights of people in need, promotes
preparedness and prevention, and facilitates sustainable solutions. Valerie Amos, the
current Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief

	
  

24	
  
Coordinator (USG), heads OCHA and oversees the coordination of relief efforts
internationally.
Shortly after the establishment of OCHA, the IASC was created in 1992 to enable
open dialogue between key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. Within the IASC,
“disputes between partners are resolved, responsibilities are allocated to the various
agencies, humanitarian policies are agreed upon, gaps are identified, and a common
ethical framework is established” (IASC Site). Therefore, the IASC is the primary
mechanism for inter-agency communication and coordination. The IASC is tantamount
to a forum, whereas OCHA ensures that directives are carried out and humanitarian needs
are met.
Both OCHA and IASC conduct affairs in Geneva, Switzerland, and four other
actors lead the emergency response on the ground. Firstly, the United Nations Joint
Logistics Centre (UNJLC) is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
logistics information. The 1996 Eastern Zaire crisis brought to light the need for better
coordination and pooling of vehicles and trucks among the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and UNICEF (Fritz Institute).
Under the custodianship of the World Food Programme, the UNJLC was formerly
recognized as a UN humanitarian response mechanism in 2002. When called upon, the
UNJLC assesses the infrastructure and schedules the movement of humanitarian cargo
and relief workers.
Secondly, the HC, the most senior UN official on site, is in charge of ensuring
that all stakeholders are meeting their obligations to the beneficiaries. The HC is tasked
with exercising diplomacy among the various NGOs, agencies, local government, donors,

	
  

25	
  
and beneficiaries. He or she has the responsibility of monitoring and assessing the
situation, then reporting to the USG in Geneva.
Thirdly, the HC has at hand the United Nations Disaster Assessment and
Coordination (UNDAC) team, which is a stand-by team of disaster management
professionals who are nominated and funded by member governments and various
agencies. In the event of a disaster, the country may request the assistance of the
UNDAC team, which “can be deployed within hours to carry out rapid assessment of
priority needs and to support national Authorities and the United Nations Resident
Coordinator to coordinate international relief on-site” (UNDAC Site).

States
During a humanitarian crisis, relations between national governments and
international humanitarian actors are often tenuous. On one hand, the government may
be highly protective of its sovereignty, and on the other hand, the international
community frequently fails to adequately include the government and local actors in
coordinating and delivering the response. Various international laws and statements of
principle designate the state as the primary actor responsible during a crisis. UN
Resolution 46/182 states,
“The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully
respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context,
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected
country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.
Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of
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natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the
affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination,
and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.”
The Sphere guidelines and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 support UN
Resolution 46/182, according the state the primary responsibility for disaster risk
reduction. ALNAP describes four main roles and responsibilities of the state:
1. The state “calls” a crisis and invites international aid,
2. The state provides assistance and protection,
3. The state monitors and coordinates external assistance, and
4. The state sets the regulatory and legal frameworks governing relief assistance.
The degree to which governments carry out these roles depends upon the nation’s
infrastructural, human resource, and material capacity. Varying situations also influence
the role of the state. In cases such as Sri Lanka, the government refuses to allow the
international actors access into the country and rejects visa and program applications. In
other cases, close cooperation between national authorities and international humanitarian
actors may lead to over-reliance, resulting in a weakened government. An overpowering
international presence can generate resentment from the people and the government as
they perceive the agencies to be more expensive and less effective. Also, the
international agencies may cause a human capital drainage; in Afghanistan, the higher
wages offered by international aid agencies draw skilled professionals away from the
government. The trend, however, shows a growing willingness on the part of the
government to respond to disasters with international aid and a parallel growth in
government capacity.
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NGOs
For the purposes of this research, humanitarian NGOs will be given an elastic
definition that carries the essence of the World Bank’s definition and combines Vakil’s
and Willets’s definitions. They are self-governing, private, mostly apolitical, not-forprofit organizations striving to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged persons
through legal means, such as advocacy and operational activities. In this context, NGOs
do not include lobbyists, pressure groups, or global civil society, and they are not all
professional given the volunteer base (Maiyegun). Their actions often reflect the
objectives of those to whom they are accountable, namely donors, beneficiaries, their
own organizational mission, and their peers with whom they collaborate. Lloyd classifies
these stakeholders in terms of the following accountabilities, respectively: upward,
downward, inward, and horizontal.
Beginning in 1968 with the adoption of the Economic and Social Council
Resolution 1296, NGOs became formally integrated into the international policymaking
scene. At the time, only international NGOs could exercise their consultative status, so
national NGOs would engage in international diplomacy through the international NGOs.
The presence of many local NGOs at the Rio Earth Summit in June 1992 spurred an
upsurge of local and national NGOs organizing in the global arena, which led to
Resolution 1996/31 and the accreditation of sub-regional, regional, and national NGOs.
Furthermore, the Cardoso Report of 2004 proposed ways to bring greater coherence and
consistency to UN-NGO relations. The proliferation of NGOs and the empowerment of
NGOs in global policymaking signified a shift away from a top-down hierarchical
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relationship between the UN and NGOs, where the NGO community simply carries out
UN initiatives and policies.
NGOs play a crucial role in humanitarian response in terms of providing relief
workers and resources. The two key NGOs are the International Federation of the Red
Cross (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the former
handling natural disasters and the latter mitigating conflict disasters. Over the past
decade, debate has risen over the relative roles of the UN humanitarian agencies and the
NGOs. While the UN agencies have the authority as neutral international bodies to lead
the centralization of the humanitarian aid structure, they are heavily dependent upon
well-established NGOs such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, CARE International, and
Catholic Relief Services because they provide invaluable support, resources, and
expertise. On the other hand, many NGOs cannot allocate sufficient staff time because
they face a tight constraint on resources. Donors would need to augment funding and
support if an NGO were to co-lead a cluster. In regard to the subject of cluster co-leads,
the Review of the engagement of NGOs with the humanitarian reform process
commissioned by The NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project articulates, “The primary
function of NGO technical staff is to support the in-country work by ensuring quality and
relevance rather than to support UN functions” (26). Nonetheless, NGOs such as the
IFRC and ICRC, whose founding dates back to 1919, bring years of experience and
institutional knowledge. Because of their heavy involvement in the humanitarian system
and the vital needs they serve, NGOs have been advocating for a greater voice in highlevel discussions with the UN agencies.
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CHAPTER IV:
LITERATURE REVIEW

THE REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER FROM STATES TO NGOS
In accordance with realism, one of the predominant schools of political thought,
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia established a political order in which the state is the
principal actor in international politics. The raison d’état revolves around national
security, which is necessary when anarchy dominates the international arena and
disincentivizes states from developing trusting relationships. Universal moral principles
do not exist in state-state relations. Therefore, the state is in the constant pursuit of
power—both military and economic—to guarantee its survival in the hostile
environment. In this political paradigm, civil society begins only after power has been
organized and security is secured. The upsurge of intrastate conflict after the end of the
Cold War, however, challenges the Westphalian state-centric model. Consider the fact
that “from May 1988…to [December 2007], there have been 47 conflicts in which the
United Nations intervened and only three of them were inter-state in character” (Yilmaz).
The decline in traditional state-to-state threat feeds “a growing sense that individuals’
security may not in fact reliably derive from their nation’s security” (Mathews).
Mathews claims that the power of states is actually declining relative to that of non-state
actors—namely, businesses, international organizations, and NGOs. Consider former US
President George H.W. Bush’s reference to service-oriented individuals and
organizations as “a thousand points of light…that are spread like stars throughout the
Nation, doing good.” He states, “We will work hand in hand, encouraging, sometimes
leading, sometimes being led, rewarding.” Clearly, the state is no longer an autonomous
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agent. “In many countries, [NGOs] are delivering the services—in urban and rural
community development, education, and health care—that faltering governments can no
longer manage,” and furthermore, “today NGOs deliver more official development
assistance than the entire UN system (excluding the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund)” (Mathews). Mathews’ article epitomizes the optimism in the 1990s
about the emergence of NGOs and civil society and their potential to “fill the gap” left
where governments will not, or cannot, function.

THE ROLE OF NGOS, RECONSIDERED
The emergence of the paradigm in which NGOs serve as principal service
providers has spurred scholarship on the question, “Who is responsible for providing,
financing, planning, and regulating services?” The World Bank suggests that the Central
Government, which traditionally has been associated with the provision of social
services, now is trending toward contributing financially and outsourcing the actual
provision of social services (Cannon). The segment opposing Mathews argues that
NGOs should not be serving in such a capacity. One of the main reasons provided is that
NGOs’ power would consequently undermine states. In addition, the NGOs’
contributions may in fact be detrimental to the population served. Christy Cannon,
Christopher Collier, and Alan Whaites articulate this perspective and advance three
arguments around several cases.
First, if NGOs are fulfilling the service provision responsibility on behalf of the
government, the government loses the chance to develop its capacity to provide the
services, and it also relinquishes its lead role in policy formation. As an example,
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Cannon notes, “Uganda’s health sector will necessarily be the responsibility of a range of
agencies for many years to come, and decentralization is well under way.” Ugandan
nationals have grown to expect “peace and security before service-provision” from their
government (Cannon). With diverse agencies at different capacity levels, different
regions often experience a range of service quality. While the decentralization of power
may promote greater partnership between the government and NGOs at the local level, it
presents a significant coordination challenge at the national level. Instead, if the
government were to manage the provision of services and centralize the process, the
quality of service provided would be standardized throughout the regions.
Second, NGOs working toward short-term goals to fill the immediate gap
sometimes lose sight of the need to sustain their interventions. While NGOs serve as
interim providers, the task ultimately falls on the shoulders of the government and local
agencies when the NGOs exit. Collier states that NGOs tend to “overlook existing local
capacities and responsibilities when designing and implementing their projects.” Besides
the inherent inefficiency, this also prevents both NGOs and local agencies from moving
forward and establishing long-term sustainable initiatives for the community. Collier
also argues that NGOs reduce the accountability of local government to the people by
“using its own front-line staff” and eliminating government participation in order to
“ensure that positive reports [flow] back to donors on a timely basis.” This practice may
help NGOs in their pursuit for additional funding, which is critical to their survival;
however, the human and financial resources of the government become overlooked in
turn, and new NGO initiatives may jeopardize existing local initiatives. Whaites supports
Collier’s argument and further proposes that NGOs exude “an over-eagerness to fill gaps
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in service provision” when they should actually “seek to build up the capacity of the
state,” barring “mitigating circumstances.” Sustainability is key to any successful service
effort, and the willing participation of local counterparts—both the people and the
government—is a necessary ingredient to sustainability. Therefore, NGOs should not
“damage prospects for genuine development by undermining the relationship between the
people and their government” (Collier). Instead, NGOs should play an intermediary role
and bring the local people and government closer in planning and implementing
development initiatives. An enforceable system to hold the government accountable
could be achieved when the NGO helps local people become aware of the responsibilities
and capacities of their government and creates a forum for popular organization and
participation (Collier).
Third, NGOs may be so intent on meeting needs that they compromise their
mission integrity in order to meet the funding criteria set forth by donors and
government. “Ugandan NGOs powerfully expressed their survival instinct, or the need to
bring in enough money to remain viable,” according to Cannon. She points to the
example of a mobile AIDS home-care program: insufficient funds prompted the dropping
of the program in two counties of the Masaka District, whereas funding from DANIDA
allowed the program to add two counties in the Rakai District. Also, NGOs tend to be
reticent about divulging budgets and work plans with others besides their donors.
Sometimes this lack of transparency between NGOs and the government contributes to
tension and rivalry. On one hand, district personnel resent NGOs for refusing to share
the financial information; on the other hand, NGOs claim they are willing to discuss and
coordinate activities. NGOs worry that the funding “may eventually prompt the
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government to institute regulations defining the kind of information which District
officials are entitled to know from NGOs” (Cannon).
Overwhelmingly, Cannon, Collier, and Whaites express the importance of NGOs
assuming roles that do not undermine the government, local agencies, and local
population. Although NGOs are vital to service provision and often provide betterquality service, the long-term sustainability of the development effort is of utmost
importance.

NGO EFFECTIVENESS, RECONSIDERED
NGO effectiveness should also be reexamined in terms of their immediate need to
sustain themselves. There is a mounting discussion on the adverse effect of material
incentives on the transnational aid sector. Some argue that financial constraints pressure
NGOs into competition for limited resources, thus generating negative consequences
when aid projects are poorly coordinated. For example, James Pfeiffer presents a case
study of Mozambique’s health sector and argues that the deluge of NGOs since the late
1980s has “fragmented the health system and contributed to intensifying social inequality
in local communities.”
The global civil society has never been as robust, as evidenced by the rapidly
growing transnational aid sector: “between 1960 and 1996, the number of INGOs grew
from 1,000 to 5,500,” more than quintupling (Cooley and Ron). The growing
organizational density, contractual incentives, and organizational pressures prod NGOs to
prioritize financial considerations over serving the people. Cooley and Ron argue that
undoubtedly “many of today’s INGOs are motivated by normative agendas,” but
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“insecurity and competition…often [push today’s INGOs] to behave in rational and rentseeking ways.” The competitive environment inhibits cooperation and even generates
incentives that result in inoperative outcomes, contrary to the popular assumption that
market-based competition produces efficiency and effectiveness. Cooley and Ron refer
to this as the “multiple-principals problem” phenomenon, which occurs when multiple
groups seeking control over the same project act unilaterally and conceal information to
undermine their competitors. Because of the competitive aid market, NGOs constantly
need to “renew, extend, or win new contracts, regardless of the project’s overall utility”
(Cooley and Ron). Together, the multiple-principals problem and competitive bidding
foster marketized mentalities and a competitive dynamic among NGOs that are
counterproductive to aid coordination and delivery.

NGOS, STATES, AND UN AGENCIES’ ROLES
This study focuses on the various coordination roles among NGOs, states, and
international agencies and contributes to the discussion by looking at the circumstances
under which NGOs can effectively respond to natural disasters. The experiences in
Myanmar and in Haiti suggest that the optimism of the 1990s may have been a premature
reaction. A disconnect exists between the NGOs’ function to provide immediate relief
and the overarching long-term development needs of the state. NGOs and international
agencies competing for scarce humanitarian funding do not have the necessary human
capital, resources, or infrastructural knowledge of the state to deliver on this front.
Neither can replace the government indefinitely.
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CHAPTER V:
RESEARCH ON HAITI AND MYANMAR

HAITI
“…In 48 seconds, life went out in Haiti. The afternoon of 12 January 2010 took
with it 300,000 lives, left one million homeless and destroyed nearly all of the
buildings in the capital, Port-au-Prince, including the Presidential Palace, the
Legislative Palace and the Palace of Justice. Other cities, including Léogane,
Jacmel and Petit-Goâve, were also severely affected. The total losses have been
estimated at around 8 billion dollars, which represents, according to experts,
120% of the GNP of Haiti in 2009.”
Fritzner Gaspard, Haitian Chargé d’Affaires in France
Situational Overview
Before examining the response to the Haiti earthquake, it is important to
understand the country of Haiti. Haiti encompasses over 27,750 square kilometers of
land in the Caribbean. The population in 2009 was 9.86 million (World Bank). Prior to
the earthquake in Haiti, “55% of the population” lived “below the international poverty
line of 1.25 USD per day,” a product of the country’s long history of natural and
manmade disasters (Dolan and Ververs). Haiti ranked 158th out of 187 countries on the
Human Development Index, which is based on a variety of indicators from health and
education to human freedoms and economic growth. A high level of social inequality
pervaded the country. The poverty and inequality created a dependence on foreign aid
and funding; prior to the earthquake, 800 national and international NGOs—all listed in
Haiti’s online directory of civil society organizations (CSO)—had a presence in the
nation.
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One of the most destructive natural disasters of the 21st century struck the nation
of Haiti on January 12, 2010. The earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter scale
dilapidated the capital of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas, killing 222,650 people,
injuring 310,930 people, displacing more than 2.1 million people, and compounding the
already high level of chronic poverty with material loss that amounted to “more than
100% of Haiti’s national income” (OCHA). The following figure depicts the
earthquake’s impact across the geographical regions in Haiti.
Figure 4. Map of Haiti Earthquake

The earthquake not only affected over 3 million people, but also crippled the Government
of Haiti (GoH) and set back the UN by taking the lives of key decision-makers and by
turning infrastructure into debris. “The Haitian government lost 33% of its personnel and
the UN lost 102 staff members,” and the building damage assessment reported 403,176
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damaged or destroyed buildings (OCHA). Beyond the deaths of decision-makers and
civil servants, the Ministry of the Interior, which housed the Emergency Operations
Center and the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC), the Port-au-Prince fire station,
and the National Disaster Risk Management System (NDRMS) were all heavily
damaged. The lack of functioning mobile phones and government vehicles cut off
communication and transportation, which were vital to GoH’s assessment of the situation
and response. Also, “30 hospitals of 49 in the affected areas were destroyed or
damaged,” severely reducing response capacity (OCHA). The Post Disaster Needs
Assessment (PDNA) estimated that the earthquake produced a total value of damage and
losses of US $7.8 billion—US $4.3 billion in physical damage and US $3.5 billion in
economic losses.7 These damages and losses reduced the country’s GDP by 70% (Office
of the Special Envoy).
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the Haitian population rose to the
challenge and led the initial response despite facing major challenges—limited first aid
knowledge, the absence of electricity, widespread debris, and personal loss and trauma.
Neighbors, local CSOs, and communities saved countless lives while the government and
international community struggled to overcome the constraints.
The GoH, although severely diminished in size and capacity to lead the initial
response, immediately worked together with the international community to implement a
coordinating mechanism and operationalized the DPC the day after the earthquake before
authorities even activated the Centre d’Opérations d’Urgence (COU) (IASC). Regular
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PDNA is a government-led exercise that pulls together information into a single, consolidated
report detailing information on the physical impacts of a disaster, the economic value of the
damages and losses, and the human impacts as experienced.
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meetings between the Council of Ministers and international representatives led to the
reactivation of the cluster approach on January 15, 2010.8 Each cluster was co-led by a
Minister or senior civil servant from a corresponding Ministry. Ministers also had to
oversee the coordination in municipalities.
At the regional level, neighboring Latin American and Caribbean countries rallied
to support Haiti. Regional entities CARICOM and OAS responded immediately with
emergency supplies and pledges of financial assistance. They also took part in strategic
recovery discussions with the GoH. The Dominican Republic, the first country to
respond due to its proximity to Haiti, generously offered food, water, and mobile medical
units. They also provided a resourceful solution to the logistical crisis in which the large
amount of debris prevented the transportation of vital supplies by offering their territory
and facilities, such as the airport, hospitals, emergency teams, and telecommunications
services.
On the international front, international Search and Rescue (SAR) teams, the
UNDAC team and other UN agencies, NGOs, international military, and humanitarian
donors contributed their personnel and resources. “Within 24 hours, 27 countries had
offered [Search and Rescue] teams and 3 were already in-country (Iceland, Dominican
Republic, and the US), and within 48 hours, 6 teams were operational” (IASC). The 13member UNDAC team mobilized with similar rapidity, arriving in Haiti less than a day
after the earthquake. UNDAC coordinated the SAR teams in addition to conducting the
initial assessments.9 By the time the GoH called off the search for survivors on January
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Clusters had been established in Haiti in 2008 to coordinate the response to the Gonaives flood
emergency.
9
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23, 2010, “67 teams had rescued a total of 134 people,” a record number for SAR teams.
NGOs prepositioned in Haiti supported the initial assistance using in-country contingency
stocks that were not damaged by the earthquake. Numerous humanitarian organizations
flooded Haiti and joined in the relief effort.
Additionally, considerable international military presence from 26 countries
facilitated the recovery effort and provided valuable services from debris management to
goods dissemination. Within the first ten days, the US military had conducted 336 air
deliveries of water, meals, and medical supplies (IASC). In the initial response stages,
the US, Canada, and the Dominican Republic contributed the largest fleets. To better
coordinate the military resources, the Coordination Support Committee (CSC) and the
Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC) were put in place. The CSC, co-chaired by
the GoH and the United Nations Stabilizing Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), was a
platform that brought together the US military, MINUSTAH, humanitarian
representatives, and donors to plan and task strategic operations in such a way as to
capitalize on the existing resources. The JOTC, established by MINUSTAH, OCHA, the
Logistics cluster, and other partners, served as a “centralized coordinating body for the
use of military assets” (IASC).
The Humanitarian Country Team, comprised of the Humanitarian Coordinator,
UN agencies, NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and
donors, played the overarching role of strategic coordination in the initial emergency
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
MINUSTAH Logistics Base in Port-au-Prince, supported by the European Civil Protection
Mechanism (EU-MIC) and staff of OCHA. Two sub-OSOCCs were established in Jacmel and
Léogâne to assist local authorities and humanitarian actors involved in the response. The UNDAC
team, in cooperation with technical experts from the EU-MIC team and the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), conducted the initial damage and impact assessment in the earthquake-affected
areas” (IASC).
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phase. Key donors included the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA), the UK Department for International
Development (DFID), and the Spanish Cooperation (AECID). OCHA assisted in an
advisory role on multiple topics from civil-military liaison to information management
and from inter-cluster coordination to mapping.
“By May 2010, over 1,000 international organizations had provided humanitarian
assistance in Haiti,” with 57% of the 1.5 billion USD Revised Humanitarian Appeal
funding obtained (IASC RTE). The Food and Shelter clusters also made headway in the
immediate aftermath with food aid, Cash for Work programs, and tarpaulin distributions.
Despite the quick mobilization of international aid, the overwhelming scale of the
disaster left international actors mired in the chaotic disorganization, and in due time, the
sizable presence of largely amateur small volunteer groups from the Caribbean and the
US—over 4,000 in total—strained the coordination system. Additionally, the “partial,
sensationalist, and celebrity-obsessed media” relayed inaccurate and skewed messages
during early stages of the response, “thereby inadvertently affecting funding allocation
decisions” (Shepherd-Barron). Inexperienced humanitarian actors, poorly adapted
practices in urban contexts, and weak global leadership undermined the efficient
activation of cluster coordination and assembly of resources between January and April
2010 (IASC RTE). The Haiti experience exposed gaps in the cluster approach when
confronted simultaneously with a colossal disaster and a severely weakened government
counterpart to a myriad of international actors.
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Nutrition Cluster
Before the earthquake, nutrition posed a challenge in impoverished Haiti. An
estimated 32% of children under the age of five experienced chronic malnutrition, and
58% of the total population suffered undernourishment (IFPRI Global Hunger Index,
FAO Statistics). Furthermore, inadequate childcare for young children imperiled their
nutritional security during the window of opportunity, “the period between conception
and age two when the irreversible damage caused by malnutrition can and should be
prevented” (ALNAP). Only 40% of children 0-6 months were exclusively breastfed, and
only 32% of children 6-24 months benefited from appropriate complementary feeding
practices. The earthquake exacerbated the food insecurity and placed large numbers of
Haitians at increased risk of mortality and malnutrition, “particularly acute malnutrition
and micronutrient deficiencies” (Flash Appeal). Haitians had less accessibility to
nutritious food and a weakened government to cope with the crisis, but the country had
an influx of humanitarian actors working on nutrition security.
The Nutrition Cluster was immediately established upon the activation of the
Cluster Approach. UNICEF served as the cluster lead when the cluster was officially
activated one week after the earthquake. The February 2010 Flash Appeal listed feeding
infants and young children and maintaining the nutritional status of children as a priority.
It also identified women—particularly pregnant and lactating mothers—and children as
the most vulnerable groups, with 1.47 million women and children needing nutritional
support, among which 360,000 consisted of children under the age of five. The World
Bank enumerated the following priority actions for securing nutrition in Haiti: (1) reduce
chronic malnutrition, (2) reduce micronutrient deficiencies in iron, iodine, and vitamin A,

	
  

42	
  
(3) reduce chronic food insecurity, and (4) improve the health system and include
nutrition services. Main elements of the cluster response addressed the nutrition
priorities by providing food rations and complementary feeding programs for at-risk
populations (Plumpynut and micronutrient powder), opening community outpatient care
centers and mobile units to treat severe acute malnutrition (SAM), mobilizing caregivers
to give nutritional counseling, and erecting baby-friendly feeding tents in camps.
Despite its efforts, the Nutrition Cluster was plagued by weak predictability and
accountability of leadership and ownership, poor cohesiveness in partnerships due to
divergent political interests, and outstanding gaps. The momentum in the rapid call to
action was not sustained in the follow-through.
Along the first dimension, the Nutrition Cluster was characterized by weak
leadership and accountability. First, a general shortage of qualified nutritionists globally
reduced the human resource (HR) surge capacity during the Haiti response. UNICEF had
to compete with other UN agencies and NGOs for qualified practitioners. The French
language prerequisite further complicated the search because far too few French-speaking
personnel could be deployed on short notice. UNICEF reflected that “the Nutrition
Cluster and section remained understaffed in terms of the number and quality of staff for
most of the response,” and “unlike in the WASH Cluster, use of standby partners and
institutional contracts with specialist organizations as an approach to rapid deployment
[was] not well developed in the Nutrition Cluster.” The Global Nutrition Cluster (GNC)
was “running at about one third of its required capacity” with one half-time Cluster
Officer and one part-time GNC Coordinator based in the UK at the time of the
earthquake (Dolan and Ververs). Also, there was an unfilled Nutrition in Emergencies
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(NIE) post in UNICEF’s headquarter Nutrition Section. UNICEF looked toward staff
from HQ, regional, and country offices to fill the capacity gap as quickly as possible due
to the lack of local staff. However, because temporary internal redeployment decreases
capacity in other countries or offices, UNICEF has since shifted their HR strategy to
emphasize sustainable funding as a way to recruit and fill key regional and country-level
cluster positions.
The shortage of UNICEF staff and the bureaucratic nature of the emergency
human resources section encumbered the aid process. Humanitarian practitioners faced
the dilemma of juggling activities critical to the response: revising Flash Appeals and
administering life-saving programs. A shortage in implementing partners paralleled the
UNICEF staff shortage; the high mortality reduced the number of available nurses and
French- or Creole-speaking nutrition experts, while survivors were often too traumatized
and preoccupied with personal matters to work effectively. Underfunding further
reduced human resources and capacity-building initiatives, such as the Nutrition Cluster
Handbook. Without the appropriate people and resources in the right place, organizations
could not take leadership or ownership of an area. Due to the critical need one month
into the disaster, the Country Nutrition Cluster (CNC) Coordinator was finally able to
secure funding to hire qualified international staff from NGOs.
In addition, UNICEF’s weak leadership contributed to significant inefficiencies.
As the designated lead agency and thus the PoLR, UNICEF was responsible for
providing resources to fill remaining gaps in the Nutrition Cluster. The unprecedented
scale of the disaster, however, placed severe strains on UNICEF in fulfilling its duty as
the PoLR. Partially due to UNICEF’s lack of technical authority, internal conflict
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erupted in the cluster as diverse partners within the Nutrition Cluster had difficulty
reaching a consensus on the correct assessment methods and the actual level of the
affected population’s needs. Nonetheless, cluster members endeavored to counter the
setbacks and to improve the cluster’s work.
Furthermore, the second dimension of accountability needed improvement on
multiple fronts: within the cluster lead organization and between the cluster lead and
cluster members. Due to the uncertain correlation between the job descriptions of the
Nutrition Cluster coordinator and UNICEF program staff, the lack of clarity and
understanding surrounding the cluster approach in the early stages of the emergency led
to poor coordination of roles and responsibility. UNICEF worked to align the two roles
and revise the terms of reference. The experience in Haiti revealed “an urgent need to
develop the respective accountability structures not only within UNICEF but also for the
partners” (Haiti Field Exchange). It also underscored the need for guidance on
mainstreaming commitments to establish clarity on cluster and coordination roles,
responsibilities, and accountabilities.
The GNC and the Country Nutrition Cluster (CNC), however, enhanced
accountability between cluster members with regular coordination meetings.10 Regular
GNC emergency coordination meetings led by the CNC Coordinator in Haiti gave global
partners—UN agencies, NGOs, and other humanitarian actors—a chance to share
information, assess the situation, and update others on the nutrition situation. Similar to
the GNC meetings, the CNC meetings provided a forum for discussion among the GoH
and international agencies, meeting frequently—“initially three times per week for up to
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Between January 15 and 18, 2010, the country-level cluster coordination team was assembled.
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1.5 hours” (Dolan and Ververs). Thirty to forty participants from a range of
organizations attended the meetings to discuss challenges and solutions. While the GNC
worked together and identified an immediate area of focus—infant and young child
feeding in the emergency (IFE), the CNC team also established focus areas, as
enumerated by Carmel Dolan, the GNC Consultant, and Mija Ververs, the CNC
Coordinator:
•

Protecting, supporting, and feeding children safely

•

Administering micronutrient supplementation

•

Overseeing community-based management of acute malnutrition

•

Controlling and coordinating breast milk substitute donations.

After the IFE Core Group identified three main areas of concern—supporting
mothers giving birth and nourishing their babies without healthcare facilities, caring for
infants in the event their mothers have died or are injured, and managing the influx of
breast milk substitutes arriving in Haiti—they discussed and leveraged lessons from the
2004 Indonesia earthquake, 2006 China earthquake, 2008 Myanmar cyclone, and 2009
Philippines floods. Indeed, they adapted the UN interagency Joint Statement used in
Myanmar and in China to the Haiti context, and radio broadcasts helped to relay
important IFE announcements to the public in Haitian Creole. Although operational
agencies had difficulty translating guidance from the Joint Statement to field work, the
fast action taken in the area of IFE speaks to the cluster approach’s strength in
galvanizing stakeholders to make joint decisions. Like the GNC, the CNC also
demonstrated both challenge and success in accountability of leadership and ownership.
On one hand, human resources posed a challenge to the CNC coordination team: some
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candidates received formal training but lacked coordination experience, while others had
experience but lacked training. On the other hand, the Director of Nutrition of the
Ministry of Health co-chaired meetings with the CNC Coordinator from UNICEF and
aligned cluster efforts with national nutrition policies.
On the second dimension, the Nutrition Cluster needed mechanisms for
actualizing the concept of peer accountability through productive partnerships. This
concept “stipulates that NGOs as cluster co-facilitators should be accountable to their
peers, since accountability toward the Humanitarian Coordinator does not apply to
organizations outside the UN system” (GPPI-URD). The unstable political landscape
rendered partnership in the cluster difficult. “Fear of exposure to public scrutiny and
critique, and the NGOs’ worry of decreasing their scope for advocacy vis-à-vis the UN”
compounded the negative effects of the political instability, inhibiting NGOs and the
government from co-facilitating the cluster (GPPI-URD). The initial confusion
surrounding the cluster approach and the lack of knowledge of some organizations could
be attributed in part to the need for greater partnerships. For example, the problematic
surplus of breast milk substitutes—well-meaning but unsolicited donations—illustrates
the detrimental effect of misinformation. In initiating or accepting these breast milk
substitutes, organizations often breached the International Code on Marketing of Breast
Milk Substitutes and obstructed meaningful aid initiatives because the CNC Coordinator
had to turn their attention to managing the unsolicited donations. The creation of
synergies between the different actors and agencies through closer cooperation would
facilitate greater information-sharing. In another example, the supply of Ready-to-Use
Infant Formula (RUIF) by a donor through an NGO highlighted “the Nutrition Cluster’s
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ability to draw on cluster partner resources in response to a need” (Haiti Field Exchange).
UNICEF provided a significant portion of the supplies in fulfillment of its duties as a
major cluster partner, but cluster members also shared the responsibility and acted as
partners. Efforts to establish coherency across plans and to implement common
strategies and standards, though much delayed, were not entirely in vain. The lack of
data on artificial feeding care estimates prompted the CNC team and partners to prepare
detailed programming guidance from scratch. Their fruitful partnership led to
productive gains in IFE programming and learning and a rapid technical response. Also,
the reliable internet connection, rebuilt several weeks after the earthquake, allowed the
CNC team to share up-to-date knowledge and useful information among partners on the
Nutrition Cluster website. Beyond intra-cluster partnerships, greater alignment was
necessary between clusters. The general emergency response failed to integrate and
prioritize the IFE program of the Nutrition Cluster, consequently leaving potential
synergies untapped. As for partnering with GoH, “UNICEF’s pre-existing country office
presence facilitated understanding of the situation and contributed to better relationships
with government” (Haiti Field Exchange). Guidelines and tools collaboratively
developed by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF before the earthquake “facilitated
consensus building, ownership and mutual interest among all partners working together,
and even with less traditional nutrition partners” (Haiti Field Exchange).
On the third dimension regarding impact on the population, the productive
partnership between the Nutrition Cluster and GoH did not extend to the interaction
between the Nutrition Cluster and the local population. “The affected population was
largely excluded from the design and implementation of the response”; beneficiaries did
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not serve in any meaningful capacity in deciding how the response was to be carried out
(Haiti Real-Time Evaluation). This contributed to UNICEF’s low NIE capacity at the
regional level. The fact that accessible beneficiaries were not included in the response
process in either design or implementation points to two realities: (1) the humanitarian
actors’ inexperience in navigating the complex urban environment, and (2) the poor effort
to increase participation by the affected population. The Nutrition Cluster’s failure to
implement mechanisms for promoting inclusive and participatory approaches toward
engaging civil society was a byproduct of the cluster approach’s endeavor to improve
accountability by focusing on formal accountability mechanisms. These formal
mechanisms include international and national humanitarian law, protocols, codes of
conducts, evaluations, memorandums of understanding, joint policy agreements, and
partnerships (ALNAP). As mentioned previously, formal accountability mechanisms
were not adequately enforced between partners. The GPPI-URD report suggests that by
focusing on formal accountability mechanisms instead of balancing formal with informal
mechanisms, the diversity and independence of actors were undermined. The formal
nature led to the formation of a hierarchy and the weakening of partnerships. The
hierarchical, top-down coordination undermined informal accountability toward civil
society, degrading the quality of the humanitarian response. Furthermore, the
hierarchical organization weakened coordination efforts. For example, decisions made at
the UNICEF headquarters and regional office regarding the nutrition supply pipeline and
logistics chain overruled decisions made by field-level nutritionists (Dolan and Ververs).
The complex organization contributed to delay, misunderstanding, and tension. Not only
did UNICEF nutritionists feel their mapping work was overlooked, but the weak
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coordination also prevented UNICEF from transporting supplies from well-stocked
warehouse to the field in a timely manner initially.
As for outstanding gaps, chronic malnutrition remained a “deeply rooted
structural challenge for Haiti’s children” one year following the earthquake (UNICEF).
Ten thousand severely acutely malnourished children without medical complications
received medical attention in 159 Outpatient Therapeutic Programs, and 1,250 severely
acutely malnourished children with medical complications were nursed in 28
Stabilization Centers (UNICEF). Nevertheless, children in distant rural areas and those
in densely populated urban slums, such as Cité Soleil and Croix de Bouquets, continued
to lack access to services. From another perspective, the relatively stable levels of acute
malnutrition testify to the efficacy of UNICEF’s preventive interventions, such as blanket
feeding and distributing micronutrients and deworming tablets. In the IFE area, UNICEF
constructed a network of 107 Baby-Friendly Tents and Corners as centers for nutritional
counseling and advice for mothers and children. “By December 2010, more than 102,000
children under twelve months and over 48,900 mothers” had benefitted from this
initiative (UNICEF). The following table tracks the cluster’s progress:
Figure 5. Haiti Nutrition Cluster Targets and Progress in 2010

In the areas of systems-strengthening and capacity-building, UNICEF assisted the
Ministry of Health financially and technically to develop a national protocol for the
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management of severe acute malnutrition. The widespread implementation of the
national protocol marked a turning point in standardization and harmonization of
practices. Another national protocol, Infant and Young Child Feeding, was created
shortly after. Once lifesaving emergency efforts mitigated immediate needs, the
Nutrition Cluster gradually turned its attention to largely unaddressed chronic needs.
The following table provides a summary of the Haiti Nutrition Cluster’s overall
performance across the three dimensions.
Figure 6. Haiti Nutrition Cluster Evaluation
Haiti Nutrition Cluster
Overall Performance: Ineffective
Partnership

Leadership and
Accountability
Ineffective
• Capacity of cluster lead
UNICEF questioned
• HR challenge
• Weak UNICEF lead
• Respective accountability
structures lacking
• Weak accountability
within cluster lead
organization and between
cluster lead and members
• Productive GNC and CNC
meetings

Adequate
• Coherency across IFE
plans
• UNICEF-GoH
collaboration before
earthquake
• Information-sharing on
website
• Poor inter-cluster
coordination
• Inefficiencies resulting
from misinformation

Impact on Population

Ineffective
• Beneficiaries excluded
from response
• Focus on formal
accountability
mechanisms
• Chronic malnutrition one
year later
• Stable levels of acute
malnutrition
• National protocol for
management of
malnutrition

WASH Cluster
James Shepherd-Barron, the third WASH Cluster Coordinator serving from May
5 to August 1, 2010, observed that even before the earthquake, Port-au-Prince “had one
of the worst sanitation situations of any capital city in the world,” with no sewage
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network or treatment plant. UNICEF reported, “Only 19% of people had access to
improved sanitation facilities, down from 29% in 1990.” The earthquake exacerbated the
poor sanitation and hygiene conditions in Haiti. UNICEF cited, “More than 1.5 million
displaced people had no immediate access to safe drinking water or a toilet, and were at
risk from sanitation- and water-related diseases.” The devastating cholera outbreak that
began in October 2010 killed more than 7,000 people and further complicated response
planning.
The WASH Cluster, co-led by UNICEF and La Direction Nationale d’Eau
Potable et d’Assainissement (DINEPA), was one of the most applauded clusters in Haiti.
It performed strongly across the three dimensions of leadership, partnership, and
accountability to the beneficiaries.
The first dimension of leadership proved to be highly effective. From providing
10.5 tons of chlorine and 45 million water purification tablets to installing and
maintaining over 11,300 latrines and campsites, UNICEF led the WASH Cluster with
great success and served as an accountable PoLR. DINEPA, the GoH regulatory
authority established in 2009 in charge of reforming Haiti’s water and sanitation system,
also took charge of the response. Trevor White, a WASH Technical Advisor for the
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID, remarked, “This was an
international emergency WASH response success. No other sector in Haiti had a
government department leading a cluster. I saw DINEPA create an environment of
cooperation—and save lives.” Jay Graham, a USAID Environmental Health Advisor,
echoed White’s applause, “DINEPA’s personnel are very committed…. I was surprised.
You hear that the cluster system doesn’t work. Here is a WASH Cluster response that is
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effective…. DINEPA places water quality test results and data on-line; they are
transparent, sensitive to requests from stakeholders, open to criticism and NGO
challenge, and forthright about sharing contacts. DINEPA and UNICEF give each
stakeholder a chance to speak at cluster meetings, and they encourage Haitians to
participate in the meetings.” The cohesive leadership allowed for the establishment of
the following Minimum Standards for Sanitation Operational Principles and Practices in
Temporary Sites as well as key Cholera Sanitation Response activities:
•

1 toilet per 50 persons

•

1 shower per 50 persons

•

Distance to furthest users no more than 50m

•

1 handwashing station per 5 toilets

•

1 to 5 toilets for disabled persons

•

Guaranteed basic sanitation (including drainage)

•

Daily disinfection of latrines (especially slabs, seats, and panels)

•

Desludging guaranteed by a company approved by DINEPA/WASH Cluster and
done on sites with DINEPA authorization.

Operational support, however, remained an area of concern for leadership and
accountability. White reported, “All responders were working 20-hour days under serious
stress.” Shepherd-Barron elaborated that while other units and sections “were housed in
air-conditioned containerized accommodation well in advance,” “the WASH Cluster
coordination team was housed in a sweltering tent where daytime temperatures hovered
in the low forties centigrade until the second week of July (i.e. 25 weeks after [the] onset
of [the] disaster).” In addition, inadequate technology—“cheap mobile phones whose
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credit regularly expired”—and inefficient transportation—“with an average of three
hours per day spent in a vehicle traveling either to or from DINEPA or visiting partners
in the field”—provided to the Cluster Coordinator raised efficiency issues (ShepherdBarron). Altogether, the poor connectivity, transport, and working environment reduced
functionality of the WASH Cluster coordination team.
As for accountability among the humanitarian actors, Shepherd-Barron noted that
“in Haiti, only 23 of the 52 organizations provided regular activity reports to the Cluster
format, with the others requiring constant follow-up.” Despite the need for follow-up and
lack of knowledge as result of inadequate information-sharing, the active leadership
assisted greatly to make the WASH Cluster system a collective effort.
Regarding the second dimension of partnerships, the Haiti WASH Cluster
demonstrated the cluster approach’s ability to bring together different actors across the
public and private sectors and to forge effective working relationships. UNICEF and
other WASH members worked together with municipal authorities and the National
Direction for Potable Water and Sanitation (DINEPA). “At the height of the emergency,
UNICEF and its partners were trucking a daily average of 8.3 million liters of clean water
to close to 60,000 people—the equivalent of a line of trucks the length of 160 football
pitches” (UNICEF). Beyond construction and water purification projects, agencies
mobilized staff to organize hygiene promotion activities and to distribute hygiene kits in
communities. In the cholera response, the WASH Cluster trained 4,500 new hygiene
promoters, engaging religious leaders, government, NGO networks, and global tools.
The WASH Cluster also worked together with schools to promote hygiene and keep
water-borne diseases at bay. UNICEF and DINEPA actively developed partnerships—
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they gathered 77 organizations to organize the Global Handwashing Day on October 15,
2010, a massive grassroots effort that impacted over 709,000 people (UNICEF). The
following figure illustrates the expansion of Global Handwashing Day in Haiti from 2010
to 2011.
Figure 7. Haiti Nutrition Cluster Global Handwashing Day Data 2010-2011

As for the third dimension, the WASH Cluster positively impacted and engaged
the local population. UNICEF, DINEPA, cluster members, and partners delivered critical
supplies and services in a timely manner under the effective co-leadership of UNICEF
and DINEPA. Graham remarked, “The cluster works fast; test results show improved
water quality.” Within two to three days of testing wells and approving good sources,
DINEPA “established a fleet of privately owned chlorinated water tankers, fuel reserves,
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and a delivery system” (Trevor). An initial inefficiency existed in the water delivery
process, but DINEPA coordinated with NGOs, who then set up water bladders and tap
stands and eliminated the queues. The following table traces the WASH Cluster’s targets
and achievements in 2010.
Figure 8. Haiti WASH Cluster Targets and Progress in 2010

Within one year, “approximately 1.72 million people have benefited from water and
sanitation assistance including safe drinking water, latrines, bathing facilities, and NFIs,
as well as the removal of solid waste and the provision of appropriate drainage”
(UNICEF). The early establishment of the water delivery system and its success can be
attributed in part to UNICEF and DINEPA’s active inclusion of the beneficiaries at
cluster meetings. Throughout the recovery phase process, the WASH Cluster identified
local authorities, community-based organizations, and community leaders as critical
partners. Leaders of groups of women in the camps and neighborhoods were engaged to
help with planning and monitoring and to ensure the appropriation and sustainability of
the sanitation response. The local population’s satisfaction was evident; they made few
complaints regarding water. Moreover, in the recovery plan for the WASH Cluster,
UNICEF and DINEPA endeavored to “put communities in the driver’s seat” and promote
community ownership of the response through transitioning the responsibility toward the
community. Its plans for Community-Led Total Sanitation and adoption of the “Strategie
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Quartier” principle demonstrated the WASH Cluster’s view toward the long-term
sustainability of relief efforts through the incorporation of the affected population.11
The following table summarizes the achievements of the Haiti WASH Cluster
along the three dimensions.
Figure 9. Haiti WASH Cluster Evaluation

Leadership and
Accountability
Effective
• Active cluster co-leads
UNICEF and DINEPA
• Minimum Standards for
Sanitation Operational
Principles & Practices
established
• Poor operational support
• Information-sharing by
cluster members needs
improvement

Haiti WASH Cluster
Overall Performance: Effective
Partnership
Effective
• Strong cluster-government
co-leadership
• Partnership with 77
organizations for Global
Handwashing Day in 2010
• Worked with schools to
promote good practices
• Effective activation of
NGOs

Impact on Population

Effective
• Latrines and campsites set
up and maintained
• Water purification
• Community needs met
• Community invited to
participate in cluster
meetings
• Community-led Total
Sanitation plan

Assessment of Haiti
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and the first year of operations,
considerable achievements were accomplished within the cluster system, and key
challenges were identified. ALNAP reported, “Overall targets across all sectors for the
first six months of the emergency response operation were met.” The 2010 IASC
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The principle of “Strategie Quartier” aims to facilitate a holistic return of camp populations to
neighborhoods.
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Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti identifies the following achievements
across the clusters:
•

4 million people have received food.

•

1.2 million people have access to safe water daily.

•

1.5 million people have received emergency shelter materials.

•

2.1 million household Non-Food Items (NFIs) have been distributed.

•

11,000 latrines have been installed.

•

90% of internally displaced persons in Port-au-Prince have access to adjacent
health clinics.

•

195,000 children have benefited from temporary learning spaces.

•

550,000 children and pregnant/lactating women have received supplementary
feeding.

•

1 million people have benefited from Cash-for-Work programs.

•

5,900 people have been relocated from imminently dangerous locations.

•

142,000 households have received agricultural inputs for spring planting.

•

2,047 separated children have been registered and 337 reunited with their
families.
Significant challenges encumbered the cluster system in Haiti. The major

roadblock revolved around the absence of the government. Decision-makers “who would
normally be expected to lead and manage the response were themselves victims of the
earthquake” (ALNAP). Debris and infrastructural damage obstructed aid, and the private
sector received a hefty blow, reducing its capacity to assist with rebuilding livelihoods.
The cluster system also had to accommodate the hundreds of aid agencies overwhelming
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the coordination structure. The tendency to use English created another problem for
coordination, as this excluded the French- and Creole-speaking national and local
authorities. In general (with the exception of the WASH Cluster), aid agencies
overlooked national and local capacities and existing guidelines and methodologies under
the pressure of the high-profile, large-scale emergency. Clearly, the response to the Haiti
earthquake was burdened with much inefficiency.
Due to efforts made by the national authorities and the humanitarian community
throughout 2010 and 2011, the humanitarian situation in Haiti has improved. “The
number of people living in camps has decreased by approximately 63% from 1.5 million
in July 2010 to 550,560 in September 2011” (Haiti 2012 Consolidated Appeal). The
GoH, now stronger, chairs or co-leads a majority of the clusters. However, the context
has changed as needs have evolved, different actors are at the helm of response and
coordination, and new issues have risen.

MYANMAR
“On 2 and 3 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, leaving
behind a trail of unprecedented destruction in the Ayeyarwady Delta and
southern Yangon Division. This natural disaster, the worst in Myanmar history,
was responsible for the loss of 138,000 lives, wide-spread destruction, shattering
livelihoods for 2.4 million people and the breakdown of economic activities and
social conditions.”
Bishow B. Parajuli, Resident Representative of UNDP Myanmar
	
  
	
  

Situational Overview
Before examining the response to Cyclone Nargis, it is important to understand
the country of Myanmar. Myanmar is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia. It
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spans over 676,578 square kilometers of land, upon which 51.5 million people resided in
2007. The OCHA Flash Appeal provides a consolidated country profile.
Figure 10. Myanmar Country Profile

Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on May 2 and 3, 2008, landing in the
Ayeyarwady Division, sweeping through the Yangon Division, and affecting over 50
townships. The category 3 cyclone, which drew wind speeds that reached 200 kilometers
per hour, and the accompanying heavy rain inflicted severe damage throughout
Myanmar, particularly in the Ayeyarwady Delta, which was struck by a 12-foot storm
surge. The following figure depicts Cyclone Nargis’s impact across the geographical
area.
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Figure 11. Cyclone Nargis: Most Affected Areas by % of Population and Area

“Nargis was the worst natural disaster in the history of Myanmar, and the most
devastating cyclone to strike Asia since 1991,” concludes the Tripartite Core Group
(TCG) in the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment.12 The unprecedented scale and magnitude of
Cyclone Nargis overwhelmed the country despite its historical experience with small to
medium-scale natural disasters, such as fires in the dry season and tropical storms in the
monsoon season.13 As of June 24, 2008, “the official death toll stood at 843,537 with
53,836 people still missing, and 19,359 injured” (TCG). In the widespread devastation,
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On May 25, 2008, at the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference organized in the
aftermath of the cyclone in Yangon, agreement was reached to form a Tripartite Core Group
(TCG) to coordinate relief efforts, bringing together the Government of the Union of Myanmar,
the United Nations, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
13

Historical data indicate that between 1996-2005, urban fires constituted about 70 percent of
disaster events, followed by floods (11 percent), storms (10 percent) and others (9 percent)
including earthquakes, tsunamis and landslides. Between 1910 and 2000, there were at least 14
major windstorms, 6 earthquakes, and 12 major floods.
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over 800,000 were displaced, and over 14.3% of the country’s population was directly
impacted based on the estimate of 7.35 million people affected by Nargis. The following
table from the OCHA Flash Appeal documents the impact by geographical division.
Figure 12. Cyclone Nargis: Impact by Geographical Divisions

As evidenced by data from the UNOSAT maps, Nargis impacted the low-lying
region of the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions most severely. The devastation
destroyed fertile fields, shelter, and water and sanitation systems as well as power and
communication lines. Torn trees, debris, and flooding blocked vital roads, and the storm
surge destroyed significant stocks of dry-season crop in the Delta region, which
“accounts for about 25 percent of the annual production in the affected area” (TCG). The
cyclone disrupted not only the livelihoods of the agrarian families, which account for 50
to 60 percent of the population in the Delta region, but also raised crop prices throughout
the country and placed vulnerable groups at a greater risk of exploitation and violence.
Vulnerable persons include women, children, elderly, the landless, and the chronically
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sick or disabled (TCG). The following table provides estimates of the agricultural losses
throughout Myanmar.
Figure 13. Cyclone Nargis: Estimates of Damage and Losses in the Agriculture Sector
(in Kyats million)

In the aftermath of the disaster, the Government of the Union of Myanmar
(GoUM), Tatmadaw armed forces, civil society, the business community, ASEAN, UN
agencies, and NGOs carried out a massive recovery effort. Immediately following the
arrival of Cyclone Nargis, the National Natural Disaster Preparedness Central Committee
(NDPCC) convened the morning of May 3, 2008, and formed ten Emergency Disaster
Response Subcommittees with respective implementation plans (TCG).14 The ten
subcommittees overseen by individual ministers covered News and Information,
Emergency Communication, Search and Rescue, Assessment and Emergency Relief,
Confirmation of Loss and Damage, Transportation and Route Clearance, Natural Disaster
Reduction and Emergency Shelter Provision, Healthcare, Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction, and Security. The GoUM, operating from the Yangon office, acted
decisively and efficiently, earmarking USD 45.45 million for disaster relief and
activating emergency relief and rehabilitation efforts. Its priorities included rebuilding
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The NDPCC, chaired by the Prime Minister General Thein Sein, was established by the GoUM
after the 2004 Asian Tsunami experience.
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houses and public infrastructure, resettling homeless persons, restoring electricity and
communication, rehabilitating drinking water sources and rice mills, and resuscitating
agricultural and urban industries (TCG). With the support of infantry servicemen from
the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces, “reinstallation of electricity and water, and
renovation of hospitals were completed within 4 days in Yangon Division which restored
33 townships back to normalcy,” and “the Yangon Division Peace and Development
Council was able to restore food and drinking water supplies within 7 days” (TCG). The
Myanmar Navy and Air Force were also activated. Military truck fleets delivered
essential supplies ranging from relief goods to water buffalos, and doctors and nurses
from the Defense Services Medical Corps administered emergency care services.
380,529 persons benefited from 419 relief camps set up by the GoUM across 29
townships in the Yangon and Ayeyarwady Divisions (TCG). The NDPCC then created a
four-phase plan to redevelop destroyed townships and to establish preparedness
mechanisms for future natural disasters. The Tatmadaw assisted the GoUM in mitigating
public panic and maintaining peace by providing security.
The Burmese people and business community assisted fellow compatriots. The
former generously shared cash, food, and household supplies that were not swept away
by Nargis, while the latter provided assistance in their particular areas of competence.
For example, engineering and construction firms contributed their manpower, equipment,
and expertise and worked closely with government authority and township leaders to
rebuild the physical infrastructure. Both secular and non-secular organizations disbursed
sizable quantities of cash and relief materials. Also, Burmese living outside the country
organized collections and returned to Myanmar to assist with the relief effort. “The
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recorded contributions in cash and kind from Myanmar nationals reached a total
of…about USD 11.86 million” by June 24, 2008 (TCG). The generous and voluntary
assistance on the part of civilians, local organizations, and the business community
helped alleviate starvation and disease and ensure the timely delivery of aid.
On a regional and international level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) played a large role in the humanitarian response. The following table
documents the assistance provided by ASEAN member states as of July 11, 2008.
Figure 14. ASEAN Member States’ Assistance to Cyclone Nargis (as of 11 July 2008)

ASEAN also partnered with various UN agencies to coordinate the international
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response. One week into the disaster from May 9-18, 2008, ASEAN deployed its
Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), through which foreign ministers
established ASEAN’s role in Myanmar: “to facilitate effective distribution and utilization
of assistance for the international community, including expeditious and effective
deployment of relief workers, especially health and medical personnel” (TCG). In other
words, ASEAN served as a critical pivot that created an environment in which a GoUMASEAN-UN partnership could materialize in the form of the nine-member Tripartite
Core Group (TCG) and enabled international aid to reach the affected population. The
following figure illustrates the ASEAN-led coordination mechanism.
Figure 15. Tripartite Core Group

In addition to setting up the TCG, ASEAN foreign ministers created the ASEAN
Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims of the Cyclone Nargis (AHTF), overseen by
ASEAN Secretary-General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan. On May 25, 2008, the ASEAN-United
Nations International Pledging Conference in Yangon formalized the collaboration
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among the GoUM, 51 countries, 24 UN agencies, the World Bank, Asian Development
Bank, and NGOs “with unanimous agreement on the need to urgently scale up relief
efforts,” which ultimately resulted in the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (TCG).

Nutrition Cluster
Prior to Cyclone Nargis, the Burmese population experienced nutrition and food
security issues not because of deficient food production, but due to severe weather
conditions and adverse government-controlled economic policies that exported food
needed by the Burmese. As a result, malnutrition posed a significant public health
problem, particularly in micronutrient deficiencies of vitamin A, iodine, and iron.
UNICEF reported that in 2008, Myanmar had 1,880,000 stunted children under the age of
five and ranked 18th out of 136 countries in stunting. The following table shows a predisaster nutritional overview of Myanmar.
Figure 16. Myanmar: Pre-Nargis Nutritional Status

Nargis aggravated nutrition security in Myanmar, as evidenced in the Village
Tract Assessment (VTA) survey the TCG carried out immediately following the cyclone
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to identify immediate relief and early recovery priorities across the affected areas. A
majority of households in the Delta region struggled to meet their basic daily food needs.
VTA results report, “42 percent of households lost all their food stocks during the
cyclone, with another 33 percent losing most or some of their stocks” (TCG). The
following chart details the availability of food stock in the Delta reported on the day of
the survey.
Figure 17. Availability of Food Stock as Reported by Households in the Delta

Also, VTA results show that out of the basic necessities, surveyed households prioritized
food most highly. According to the following graph, 89% of surveyed households placed
food as a top priority, 32% selected health, followed by education, shelter, clothing, and
hygiene.
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Figure 18. Priority Expenditures as Ranked by Households in the Delta

On the international front, the Nutrition Cluster formed before Cyclone Nargis
even struck Myanmar. From the drafting of the cluster contingency plan in April 2008 to
mid-June 2009 after Cyclone Nargis, the Nutrition Cluster remained fully operational.
UNICEF served as the cluster lead, and three working groups chaired by different
organizations existed within the cluster. These include Nutrition Surveillance, Infant
Feeding in Emergency (IFE), and Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition
(CMAM), which were chaired respectively by UNICEF, Save the Children, and ACF.
Notably, the National Nutrition Centre of the Ministry of Health, a GoUM entity, co-led
the robust Nutrition Cluster, and “Technical Medical Officers (TMO) acted as field
coordinators supported by UNICEF field nutrition staff” (GPPI-URD). The IASC
response summary lists the work of the Nutrition Cluster as one of the achievements in
the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. Nutrition support sustained 31,600 malnourished
children, and “1,100,000 people [received] food aid” (GPPI-URD). Based on the UN
Country Team’s (UNCT) plans of assisting a “minimum of 1,500,000 persons for at least
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three months,” the Nutrition Cluster achieved 73% of its initial goal in reaching out to
1,100,000 persons (OCHA Myanmar Flash).
The table below summarizes the Nutrition Cluster’s strengths in the areas of
accountability, leadership, and partnership, particularly with the GoUM, and its relative
weakness in maintaining accountability to the affected population.
Figure 19. Myanmar Nutrition Cluster Approach Evaluation
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First, strong leadership and accountability were evident in the presence of training
and technical advice groups, additionally deployed surge personnel, GenCap and ProCap
advisors, and global cluster coordinators conducting on-site visits. Their vigorous
leadership provided critical human resource expertise and coordination. In particular, the
active and dedicated global cluster coordinators “led to technical exchanges over the
latest treatment techniques for acute and moderate malnutrition” as a result of their clear
designation and the establishment of the Terms of Reference (GPPI-URD). One should
note, however, that although the Terms of Reference for country-level cluster leads
endorses participatory and community-based approaches, “there has been little focus on
monitoring and improving downward accountability mechanisms within the framework
of the humanitarian reforms,” according to the Review of the engagement of NGOs with
the humanitarian reform process.
Second, a robust partnership between the Nutrition Cluster and the GoUM
promoted accountability between cluster members. The GoUM co-chaired at the national
level and at the township level. In response to the aggravated malnutrition situation, the
GoUM, acting through the Ministry of Health and the National Nutrition Center,
collaborated on multiple fronts with a broad range of agencies from UN agencies to
international and local NGOs. With the GoUM playing an active role in facilitation,
communication networks were opened, allowing for information exchange, which helped
develop strong informal accountability among the many humanitarian organizations.
Working in collaboration with the GoUM at national-level cluster meetings and special
meetings, the Nutrition Cluster helped develop national policy—guidelines for the
treatment of moderate acute malnutrition—and achieved government authorization.
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Cluster work plans emerged from productive meetings in which cluster members agreed
upon action points and “assigned responsibilities for activities to specific organizations”
(GPPI-URD). Due to the overall cohesiveness within the Nutrition Cluster, cluster
members commonly expressed in the Nutrition Cluster overview and proposed transition
strategy, “Nutrition Cluster has achieved mutual accountability between UN, non-UN and
government as well in the areas of response where agencies have made commitments”
(GPPI-URD).
Third, the Nutrition Cluster’s success can be seen in the reduction of outstanding
gaps, but engagement of the local population remained inadequate. According to the
World Food Programme, “17,000 megatons of food commodities had been delivered to
730,000 beneficiaries in the Delta,” and “an additional 50,000 beneficiaries received cash
transfer for food commodities in Yangon local markets.” UNICEF distributed “more
than 200 tons of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RTF)” to partners in the field (TCG).
Together, UNICEF and the Ministry of Health established 4 hospital therapeutic feeding
units and trained workers in targeted feeding for children. The VTA further illustrates
the significance of humanitarian aid; 51% of the households report receiving food from
humanitarian agencies, while 54% sourced food from local markets. Many households
were dependent upon multiple food sources because Cyclone Nargis compounded preexisting food access issues. The following pie chart provides a graphical representation
of the various food sources.
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Figure 20. Sources of Food as Reported by Households in the Delta

Periodic Review III, sponsored by TCG, provided insight eighteen months into the
disaster from October 21 to November 17, 2009. The first of the two following maps
shows the ongoing moderate to severe food insecurity in 2009, and the second map
shows the level of acute malnutrition across Myanmar during that time.
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Figure 21. Myanmar Food Security Situation in 2009
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Figure 22. Myanmar Levels of Acute Malnutrition in 2009

Although the Nutrition Cluster reduced outstanding gaps, information-sharing and
engagement of affected populations required greater attention. From the Social Impacts
Monitorings carried out in November 2008, the following conclusions were drawn:
“communities often did not know who was giving them assistance,” “communities did
not know how or to whom to complain and the consequences of complaining,” and
information was disseminated “almost exclusively in English” at the Yangon level,
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inhibiting local participation. The Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE)
elaborates that the cluster would forward complaints from the community to concerned
agencies instead of following up on the complaints. Indeed, the Nutrition Cluster found
“accountability to beneficiaries [to be] the weakest area, which needs greater attention
through clusters” (GPPI-URD). To address the accountability gap, the RTE report
recommends outreach activities to garner feedback from local stakeholders and to verify
Who, What, Where (3W) information by cluster and by area.15
Outstanding gaps remained after the Nutrition Cluster closed in June 2009.
Although 45% of the surveyed households—mainly in the southern regions along
Nargis’s path—received food assistance, food insecurity remained a concern around the
loci of Pyapon and Bogale. Also, the concentration of assistance in the more affected
areas created a nutritional imbalance, with children’s nourishment weakest outside the
most affected areas, as evidenced by the higher rate of malnutrition in the Pathein
division in the map above. While the community continued to slowly wean off of food
aid, the focus had shifted from food and nutrition to livelihood recovery.
The table below summarizes the performance of Myanmar’s Nutrition Cluster
across the three dimensions.
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The Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) employed the 3W coordination tool and
created a database to share which organizations were carrying out which activities in which
locations.
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Figure 23. Myanmar Nutrition Cluster Evaluation

Leadership and
Accountability
Effective
• Training and technical
advice groups available
• Active global cluster
coordinators
• Informal accountability
• ToR established
• Downward accountability
needs greater attention

Myanmar Nutrition Cluster
Overall Performance: Effective
Partnership
Effective
• Co-facilitation by GoUM
and cluster
• Cluster collaborated in
developing national policy
• Open communication
• Information-sharing needs
greater attention

Impact on Population

Adequate
• Beneficiaries excluded in
response planning
• Beneficiaries uninformed
• Food commodities
delivered and feeding
units built
• Program for cash transfer
for food commodities

WASH Cluster
Cyclone Nargis also aggravated water and sanitation and health issues in
Myanmar. Before Cyclone Nargis struck, rural communities amassed their water supply
by harvesting rainwater in tanks, communal rainwater ponds and wells. The following
graphs prepared by UNICEF show greater use of improved drinking water sources in
rural Myanmar than in urban areas, but a slightly greater percentage of urban residents
using improved sanitation facilities than rural residents.
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Figure 24. Myanmar: Pre-Nargis Water and Sanitation

The cyclone and ensuing flooding “damaged close to 13% of ponds in Yangon
and up to 43% of ponds in Ayeyarwady Division” (TCG). The following table illustrates
the varying availability of the water sources before and after the cyclone salinized potable
water sources.
Figure 25. Sources of Water Before and After Cyclone in Yangon and Ayeyarwady
Divisions
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In terms of damages and losses in the water supply sector, the following table shows a
total of 8,516,000,000 Kyats in damage and loss in the water supply sector.
Figure 26. Damage and Loss Estimates in the Water Supply Sector (Kyats million)

The flooding demolished most latrines that existed in a majority of communities in the
Yangon and Ayeyarwady Divisions before Cyclone Nargis struck. As a result, “the
proportion of households practicing unsanitary defecation—open defecation, floating
latrines or trenches—almost doubled to 40%” (TCG). Furthermore, households relying
on river water as a drinking water source faced serious health risks, particularly with the
greater use of floating latrines. Despite the contamination of the water and living
conditions in the camps, the World Health Organization reported no serious peak in
diarrhea. The WASH Cluster responded by supplying 800,000 liters of water per day to
250,000 persons through 29 water treatment plants and rehabilitating 250 ponds (TCG).
Unlike the Nutrition Cluster, the WASH Cluster was activated directly after
Cyclone Nargis hit and closed a year later in June 2009. Coordination took place at the
national level and township levels by the cluster lead UNICEF. The figure below shows
overall poor performance across the various indicator scales in the WASH Cluster.
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Figure 27. Myanmar WASH Cluster Approach Evaluation

These findings reflect weaknesses across the three dimensions—in the predictability and
accountability of leadership and ownership, in deficient cohesiveness in partnerships, and
in gaps that emerged from government restrictions and the missing local voice.
First, the WASH Cluster demonstrated poor leadership and accountability.
Findings from the May 2009 review of the Global WASH Learning Project reflect this.
In the first finding, cluster members expressed concern with UNICEF’s capacity to lead
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the cluster and implement work plans. Humanitarian actors strongly questioned the role
of UNICEF as lead agency for the WASH Cluster. Typically, UN agencies oversee the
coordination, and implementing partners handle the operations. UNICEF’s role as a
direct project implementer raised concerns because cluster members doubted its capacity
to manage both coordination and implementation. In the second finding, cluster members
desired additional support from the global level, especially as tensions arose between
cluster members and the cluster lead UNICEF regarding funding issues. The following
figure shows that the percentage of funding exceeded the percentage of requirements by
7% for the lead agency UNICEF, which may be the root of the funding dissension.
Figure 28. Distribution of Revised Flash Appeal Requirements and Funding per
UN and Non-UN Agencies
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Second, the WASH Cluster did not embrace participatory and collaborative
approaches. The Phase II country report for Myanmar elaborates further on this aspect of
the WASH Cluster. Regarding cluster support, global clusters provided national clusters
with beneficial guidelines, policies, and handbooks; however, these tools were poorly
adapted to local needs at times due to the insufficient inclusion of local persons in cluster
meetings. On one hand, prompt support from the cluster coordinator expedited recovery.
For example, the WASH Global Cluster Rapid Response Team contributed an expert
staffer to help support cluster members in managing water scarcity. On the other hand,
the timeliness of the support provided by the global clusters received criticism. Cluster
members received the WASH Cluster Coordination Handbook after the cluster had
finished its work, and the expert staffer assigned to help manage the water scarcity crisis
also arrived belatedly. Most alarmingly, knowledge from the global clusters did not
funnel beyond the national level, and the local level suffered from the lack of
communication. Furthermore, decision-making at the field level was hindered by the fact
that “the actual number of decision-making (and technically knowledgeable)
representatives who were present during these meetings [were] actually low” (WASH
Cluster evaluator).
Third, the local population was not adequately engaged, and outstanding gaps
remained. The Periodic Review III from October to November 2009 paints the postcluster WASH situation. As shown by the following map, the red patches in Pyapon and
in scattered patches in the most affected areas reveal an uneven distribution of improved
sanitation facilities. Although a greater number of households had access to improved
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sanitation facilities, 43% of the overall population still expressed sanitation facilities were
their most pressing need.
Figure 29. Myanmar Distribution of Improved Sanitation Facilities

Water, on the other hand, seemed to be less of a focus for the population. Only 7% of the
overall population listed water as a priority, and most of these were concentrated in the
areas to the northeast of the most affected areas.

	
  

83	
  
Figure 30. Myanmar Water Supply

It is important to note the developing gap between the most affected and less affected
regions. The following figures showcase latrines received, hygiene items received, and
hygiene messaging received.
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Figure 31. Myanmar Latrines Received

Figure 33. Myanmar Hygiene
Figure 32. Myanmar Hygiene Items Received
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The following table summarizes the Myanmar WASH Cluster performance across
the three dimensions.
Figure 34. Myanmar WASH Cluster Evaluation
Myanmar WASH Cluster
Overall Performance: Ineffective
Partnership

Leadership and
Accountability
Ineffective
• Cluster members
questioned capacity of
cluster lead UNICEF
• Absent decision-makers
• Timeliness detrimental to
operationalization of tools
and guidelines

Ineffective
• Knowledge funneled from
global to national-level
• Lack of communication to
local level
• Low attendance at cluster
meetings
• Handbooks and tools
poorly adapted to local
needs

Impact on Population

Ineffective
• Uneven distribution of
sanitation facilities
• Beneficiaries excluded in
response planning
• Beneficiaries uninformed
• Aid concentration in mostaffected disaster areas
sidelined least-affected
disaster areas

Assessment of Myanmar
Cyclone Nargis left a fatal path of destruction in Myanmar and produced an
estimated total of USD 4,057 million in damages to physical assets and economic
decline. The magnitude of the disaster is delineated by the fact that “the value of damage
and losses is equivalent to 21 percent of the country’s gross domestic product” of the
2007 fiscal year (TCG). The following table provides an overall summary of the damage
and losses incurred in monetary terms.
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Figure 35. Cyclone Nargis: Overall Summary of Damage and Losses

In preparation for the phasing out of the emergency cluster system in June 2009,
the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) was launched in February
2009. The three-year recovery plan incorporated the effective cluster coordination
mechanism by consolidating the cluster areas into three Delta Working Groups: Basic
Services (health, water, sanitation and hygiene, education, nutrition), Livelihood
(livelihood, food security), and Social and Physical Protection (protection of vulnerable
groups, environment, shelter and disaster risk reduction) (TCG).
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CHAPTER VI:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Important insight into humanitarian coordination and response may be gleaned
from comparing Haiti and Myanmar. After a pre-disaster country analysis and study of
the early response at the onset of the disasters, this section examines the following four
comparisons of the cluster approach as employed in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters in
the two countries.
•

Haiti WASH Cluster and Myanmar WASH Cluster

•

Haiti Nutrition Cluster and Myanmar Nutrition Cluster

•

Haiti WASH Cluster and Haiti Nutrition Cluster

•

Myanmar WASH Cluster and Myanmar Nutrition Cluster.

PRE-DISASTER AND EARLY RESPONSE COUNTRY COMPARISON
To better understand the rollout of the clusters, one must first study Haiti’s and
Myanmar’s situation before the disaster took place and the situation at the onset of the
disaster to identify the constraints and opportunities that enabled the various actors to
evolve into their eventual roles.
One must examine Haiti’s and Myanmar’s respective political and economic
environment during the onset of the crises for a better understanding of the situational
constraints that can potentially impede aid efforts. Haiti, the poorest nation in the
Western Hemisphere with 80% of the population living below the poverty line, struggles
with insufficient investment, infrastructure, and security (IRIN). Haiti overcame Spanish
and French colonial oppression and entered a precarious semi-presidential republic in
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1987, whereas Myanmar struggled with poverty, corruption, and ethnic conflict flamed
by pervasive government controls under the authoritarian military junta. Despite its
wealth of natural resources, Myanmar’s economy is severely stunted by military-run
enterprises monopolizing key industries and a black-market-driven economy (IRIN).
Clearly, the social and economic challenges in Haiti and in Myanmar limited the capacity
for state leadership and citizens to develop and implement disaster preparedness
initiatives. Periodic man-made disasters and smaller-scale natural disasters in both
countries may have equipped the government with certain tools and mechanisms and the
people with the mentality to persevere; however, no experience could have prepared
either country for disasters on the order of a 7.0 earthquake or a category 3 cyclone.
Both countries depended on international aid, but while the GoH welcomed the
UN, foreign military units, and NGOs, the GoUM strongly resisted foreign assistance at
the onset of the disaster. The GoH’s receptiveness to international aid and expedited
activation of the cluster system reflect several key acknowledgements. First, the GoH
established disaster response as the nation’s priority. Second, the government recognized
its inability to lead and coordinate the response. Third, the GoH acknowledged the
capability of the NGOs present in the country. Finally, in reactivating the cluster system,
the GoH demonstrated its confidence in the previous clusters rolled out in response to the
tropical storms and hurricanes of 2008. The GPPI-URD cluster evaluation of the 2008
tropical storms and hurricanes remarks that the cluster approach improved coordination,
partnership, information-sharing, and leadership predictability.
On the other hand, the GoUM sought international aid selectively. The
isolationist military regime refused to grant Western agencies access into Myanmar even
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as the delay in relief efforts resulted in more and more casualties. At the onset of the
disaster, the military junta seized UN food aid, denied humanitarian workers visas, and
deported Westerners from checkpoints throughout the Delta region. Specifically, the
GoUM refused to admit French and American naval vessels and military planes carrying
relief supplies based on the argument that these were war machines being used for
gunboat diplomacy. The Burmese government’s initial response is reflective of the
common misconceptions that international NGOs are agents of other governments and
that foreign governments plot to usurp control over the country via aid. Initially, the
GoUM may have believed in its own capacity to rescue its citizens from the crisis
because of its Tatmadaw military and operational ministries and its National Natural
Disaster Preparedness Central Committee. Also, political motivations influenced the
GoUM, especially with the impending constitutional referendum on May 10, 2008. The
military junta was heavily criticized for prioritizing its political agenda over the needs of
the population. On one hand, the ruling party sought to manage the crisis and garner
public favor for the upcoming referendum. On the other hand, the GoUM wished to
prevent the international community from witnessing the devastation, criticizing the
response, and potentially taking action against the ruling party. Nevertheless, a limited
number of visas were distributed eventually, and a fraction of the available international
aid supplies were admitted into the country. The British Prime Minister remarked, “This
is inhuman. We have an intolerable situation created by a natural disaster. It is being
made into a man-made catastrophe by…the neglect and the inhuman treatment of the
Burmese people by a regime that is failing to act and to allow the international
community to do what it wants to do” (Brown). Other countries maintained, however,
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that state sovereignty must not be violated. In part due to the outcries for the UN to
invoke the “responsibility to protect” doctrine and to act even without the junta’s consent,
the resistance was relatively short-lived. Authorities made gradual concessions as they
saw the rising death toll and witnessed the deteriorating situation. When ASEAN stepped
in as the mediator between the GoUM and the international community, the Burmese
benefited from the increased aid.
The respective governments’ attitude and disposition toward foreign aid greatly
influenced leadership and partnerships and created different coordination challenges
within the cluster approach. In Haiti, the open invitation for aid led to the massive influx
of NGOs, which created an abundance of parallel and sometimes dysfunctional
coordination mechanisms. Severely weakened by the earthquake, the GoH could not
regulate the multitude of actors and aid initiatives. In contrast, the GoUM rejected
outside help out of mistrust. By politicizing aid, the military junta also raised anxiety
among aid workers and charities, who were concerned that their aid, if distributed
without supervision, may be coopted for political purposes and handed out at political
rallies in exchange for votes during the constitutional referendum. Ultimately, the mutual
distrust between restrictive governments and the aid community further victimizes the
disaster-affected population. Fortuitously in Myanmar’s case, the GoUM cautiously
opened its borders with ASEAN acting as a buffer.
Despite the contextual similarity in Haiti and Myanmar—both impoverished
countries responded to unprecedentedly massive natural disasters using the cluster
approach—the immediate assistance, coordination, rollout, progress, and effectiveness
differed not only between the two countries, but also among clusters within the countries.
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HAITI WASH AND MYANMAR WASH COMPARED
Overall, the Haiti WASH Cluster had a stronger performance than the Myanmar
WASH Cluster. In the area of leadership and accountability, UNICEF and GoH served
as active cluster co-leads in Haiti, and the GoUM acted as a withdrawn facilitator to the
weak UNICEF cluster lead in Myanmar. On one hand, the GoH had DINEPA in place,
which brought into play existing water and sanitation national guidelines and facilitated
the development of Minimum Standards for Sanitation Operational Principles and
Practices. The co-leadership also contributed to a smooth transition for post-cluster
coordination and response, as the GoH could easily maintain and sustain the relief efforts.
On the other hand, the largely absent GoUM did not have a water and sanitation-focused
department that actively engaged with the cluster. The absence of the GoUM coupled
with a weak UNICEF cluster lead greatly undermined the effectiveness of the Myanmar
WASH Cluster. In the area of partnership, Haiti WASH Cluster co-leads actively sought
partners and attempted to activate NGOs, while the Myanmar WASH Cluster struggled to
maintain attendance levels at cluster meetings and to manage communication. Finally in
the area of impact on the population, the Haiti WASH Cluster outshined the Myanmar
WASH Cluster in informing and engaging local populations as well as in meeting their
needs. Clearly, the strong co-leadership in the Haiti WASH Cluster galvanized the
coordination and relief efforts, allowing for an effective response. A stronger cluster lead
in the Myanmar WASH Cluster may have improved communication, aid supply, and the
timeliness of the operationalization of guidance, but the sustainability of the response
ultimately falls upon the GoUM.
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HAITI NUTRITION AND MYANMAR NUTRITION COMPARED
In contrast to the Haiti WASH Cluster and Myanmar WASH Cluster comparison,
the Myanmar Nutrition Cluster proved to be more effective than the Haiti Nutrition
Cluster. In Myanmar, active global cluster coordinators and global support facilitated
Nutrition Cluster operations, whereas in Haiti, cluster members questioned the capacity
of the UNICEF cluster lead, and UNICEF faced staff shortages. On one hand, the GoUM
co-facilitated the cluster in Myanmar, and its participation opened communication
networks. On the other hand, the involvement of the authoritarian government raised
concerns on information-sharing and on downward accountability. In Haiti, the GoH
played a smaller role in the cluster due to its diminished capacity following the
earthquake. Nonetheless, pre-disaster collaboration between the cluster lead UNICEF
and GoH facilitated the development of a national protocol for the management of
malnutrition, and cluster members shared information on the cluster website. Both
Nutrition Clusters failed to include beneficiaries in the response planning. In fact, the
Burmese cited human rights violations in the form of misappropriated aid. “Military
trucks delivered rice and oil from international donors for resale in markets,” according to
representatives of various interest groups in the Post-Nargis Analysis: The Other Side of
the Story. In other cases, GoUM authorities or army soldiers would demand “Yes” votes
from survivors in the national referendum in exchange for aid. Overall, greater gaps
remained in Haiti’s Nutrition Cluster as compared to Myanmar’s Nutrition Cluster.
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HAITI WASH AND HAITI NUTRITION COMPARED
Within Haiti, the WASH Cluster outperformed the Nutrition Cluster. Multiple
factors accounted for the relatively weaker performance in some clusters. First, feeble
humanitarian leadership in the Nutrition Cluster prevented decisive action in the
extremely time-sensitive situation. The WASH Cluster benefited from not only a strong
UNICEF cluster co-lead, but also a strong government cluster co-lead in the form of
DINEPA. Second, the lack of a common information management system across the
regional, national, and international levels contributed to inefficiencies in the Nutrition
Cluster. Duplicative efforts and confusion among humanitarian practitioners weakened
accountability in the Nutrition Cluster, especially since the cluster lead could not play a
decisive role. Also, humanitarian practitioners had to divert energy and time away from
lifesaving missions when inappropriate solutions were put in place following inaccurate
assessments and when the wrong resources were provided. Strong partnerships in the
WASH Cluster prevented these inefficiencies. Third, participatory approaches were not
adopted to engage the local population in the Nutrition Cluster, whereas the WASH
Cluster actively engaged community members in cluster meetings and in post-cluster
plans. Despite the fact that UNICEF served as the cluster lead in both clusters, the cluster
coordinators for WASH proved to be much more effective than those for Nutrition.
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MYANMAR WASH AND MYANMAR NUTRITION COMPARED
In the case of Myanmar, the Nutrition Cluster displayed a stronger performance
than the WASH Cluster. The effectiveness of the cluster approach in the Nutrition
Cluster depended upon the co-facilitation by the GoUM, active global cluster
coordinators, strong global cluster support, and existence of informal accountability
mechanisms between the humanitarian actors. In contrast in the WASH Cluster, the
weak cluster lead, absence of decision-makers, and poor adaptation of global guidance to
local needs jeopardized the cluster’s effectiveness. On the partnership front, the Nutrition
Cluster also fared better than the WASH Cluster, particularly because the WASH Cluster
failed to channel communication to the local level. Finally, both the Nutrition Cluster
and the WASH Cluster excluded beneficiaries in coordination and response planning.
The Nutrition Cluster, however, more adeptly filled need gaps than the WASH Cluster.

	
  

95	
  

CHAPTER VII:
CONCLUSION

The experiences of Haiti and Myanmar clearly show the interlinked nature of the
multiple variables in disaster coordination and response. All elements need to work in
concert in order for humanitarian response to have the greatest positive impact on the
affected populations. Consider the WASH Cluster in Haiti, where the effective coleadership of UNICEF and DINEPA facilitated the development of sanitation standards,
which cluster members and partners used to promote good hygiene practices and to set up
latrines and campsites. The co-leads engaged community leaders, whose local insight
helped the cluster to improve the response. Their outreach to schools and to NGOs
allowed for an efficient response and expedited the transition to the recovery phase.
Evidently, the strength of the leadership greatly bolstered other variables, leading to a
positive outcome for the beneficiaries. The Nutrition Cluster in Myanmar achieved some
success as well because various effective elements in the response built upon each other.
Conversely, humanitarian response suffers when one weakness triggers another.
Myanmar’s WASH Cluster and Haiti’s Nutrition Cluster demonstrate this negative
trajectory: the weakness of the UNICEF cluster lead raised doubts among cluster
members, rendering them unable and unwilling to fully support and engage in the cluster
system. Without a coordination framework, operational knowledge, or input from the
affected population, humanitarian actors could not deliver the right aid in a timely
manner to the right people. The chart below summarizes the cluster approach’s
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effectiveness along the three dimensions examined in the four case studies: leadership
and accountability, partnership, and impact on the population.
Figure 36. Haiti and Myanmar: Overall WASH and Nutrition Cluster Assessment
Nutrition Cluster

Haiti

Myanmar

Overall Performance: Ineffective
• Leadership and Accountability:
Ineffective
• Partnership: Adequate
• Impact on Population: Ineffective
Overall Performance: Effective
• Leadership and Accountability:
Effective
• Partnership: Effective
• Impact on Population: Adequate

WASH Cluster
Overall Performance: Effective
• Leadership and Accountability: Effective
• Partnership: Effective
• Impact on Population: Effective
Overall Performance: Adequate
• Leadership and Accountability:
Ineffective
• Partnership: Ineffective
• Impact on Population: Ineffective

The four clusters examined in Chapter V reveal four fundamental features of
humanitarian coordination and response: (1) the positive correlation between sustained
leadership and coordination, (2) the significance of developing trust and openness
between actors, (3) the need to involve and support national leadership from the initial
response, and (4) the amplified efficiency and effectiveness from leveraging
international, national, and local capacities.
In light of these insights, the validity of the two hypotheses can be examined.
Hypothesis 1: The cluster approach, which has its basis in the argument that
coordination among the different humanitarian actors is essential to effective
humanitarian response, helps to surmount the systemic challenges impeding effective
humanitarian response.
Hypothesis 2: In the absence of a working host government, a robust
international NGO or agency may be able to administer government functions
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temporarily. The humanitarian response remains incumbent upon the national
government—and, to a lesser extent, local NGOs—to reinstitute their services.
Features 3 and 4 lend support to Hypothesis 1. If national authorities need to be
involved and supported in the response from the onset of the disaster, it follows that
coordination between national authorities and other humanitarian actors must take place.
In exceptional cases where the government is especially strong, it may not need
additional support. Also, in order for international, national, and local capacities to be
leveraged altogether, some form of coordination must exist. The following diagram
illustrates the correlation between Feature 4 and Hypothesis 1.
Figure 37. Feature 4 Supporting Hypothesis 1
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Features 2 and 1 raise questions that challenge Hypothesis 1. By emphasizing the
importance of trust and openness between actors, Feature 2 downplays the role of
coordination and proposes that coordination can only occur when actors trust one
another. In other words, trust and openness form the basis of an effective response.
Figure 38. Feature 2 Reinterpreting Hypothesis 1
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Similarly, Feature 1 suggests that either strong sustained leadership or strong
coordination may directly produce increased response efficiency and effectiveness, as
shown in the figure below.
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Figure 39. Feature 1 Reinterpreting Hypothesis 1
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Several observations can be made regarding Hypothesis 2 and Features 1 and 3.
Feature 3 calls upon other actors to support national leadership from the initial response,
which directly refutes the idea that a robust international NGO or agency may stand in for
the government. If a robust international NGO or agency were to temporarily administer
government functions, it would in effect sideline any existing government capacity.
According to Feature 3, the NGO or agency should collaborate with the government in
the response with the goal of building the government’s capacity to administer the
services.
On the other hand, Feature 1 does not necessarily refute Hypothesis 2, but it
places a caveat on Hypothesis 2. The leadership turnover from NGO or agency to the
government, as proposed in Hypothesis 2, contrasts with Feature 1, which calls for
sustained leadership. This implies that the leadership turnover proposed in Hypothesis 2
would negatively impact coordination unless the government has a leadership role to
begin with.
In essence, Hypothesis 1 is supported by Features 3 and 4 and challenged by
Features 1 and 2, while Hypothesis 2 is not supported by any of the features. In other
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words, in an environment of trust and openness, strong cluster coordination can empower
leadership and help leverage the full range of existing capacities, resulting in an effective
response. As supported by the Haiti and Myanmar case studies and illustrated in the
figure below, the humanitarian response needs to integrate the elements of building trust
and open communication, coordinating and leveraging capacities, and strengthening
leadership in order for the cluster approach to reach its potential effectiveness.
Figure 40. Revised Hypothesis 1
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Moving forward, important lessons can be drawn from Haiti and Myanmar to
ensure that disaster response occurs in an environment of trust and openness, that strong
cluster coordination empowers leadership and leverages existing capacities, and that an
effective response is achieved. First, the success or failure of relief operations depends
largely upon the availability and quality of staff. In the case of Myanmar, restricted
access into the country meant that the surge capacity was limited to the personnel already
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on the ground.16 As for Haiti, the debris-choked roads and reduced local capacity
decreased the availability of qualified staff. The most successful instances were those
where strong cluster coordinators with a team to operationalize the response plan took
action. Second, the affected government, civil society, and local private sector should be
empowered to play a central role in the humanitarian response. Even the most devastated
communities and governments retain certain levels of capacities. The resilience of the
Haitian and the Burmese civil society in not only rebuilding their own livelihoods but
also actively assisting one another illustrates the often untapped potential. Third,
integration of knowledge from previous disasters, better capacity assessments, and more
accurate needs assessments of affected populations must be undertaken with a common
set of standards and methodologies. A vast reservoir of institutional knowledge from past
experiences with similar disasters and contexts exists, but it is often overlooked in the
initial chaos of the disaster and later untapped when coordinators have already created
new response plans. OCHA provides the tools to establish an information management
network, but it is the responsibility of the practitioners on the ground to input the
information into the databases in a timely manner and to disseminate it in local
languages. Similarly, coordination and response often exclude civil society, who is
actually the most knowledgeable about needs and outstanding gaps. Effectiveness of the
response would increase dramatically if these inefficiencies were addressed.
These core lessons from Haiti and Myanmar all point toward the importance of
partnerships in disaster coordination and response. As Benjamin Franklin prescribed,
“All who think cannot but see there is a sanction like that of religion which binds us in
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Surge capacity refers to an agency’s ability to scale up its program in response to needs.
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partnership in the serious work of the world.” Though still in its infancy, the cluster
approach, one of the three pillars of humanitarian reform, holds great promise for disaster
response and coordination because it embraces and upholds the principle of partnership,
and it is vital for all humanitarian actors to continue learning from each response and
improving their collaboration.
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